


# Marine Corps Gazette

February 1952

thirty cents



이것이 우리의 패러다임





# Marine Corps Gazette

FEBRUARY 1952

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**Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor that of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.**

**THIS MONTH'S COVER**—There's much conjecture around the GAZETTE offices whether our staff artist in Korea has drawn himself into the picture on our cover (The Marine being helped up the hill). Sgt Packwood shows a Marine position on Hill 884, with mortar fire coming in. BACK COVER: "Hill" 884 in the foreground.

Picture credits: All pictures official Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps photos unless otherwise credited.

## MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Professional Magazine for the United States Marines  
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ADVERTISING: Capt Murray Martin, USMCR, 2 West 46th Street, New York 19, N. Y. Phone LUXemburg 2-1540.

**THIS MONTH AND NEXT**—In our opinion *Japanese Defense of Iwo Jima*, on page 18 of this issue, is one of the most interesting articles we have read in years. Maj Horie, general staff officer and last defender to leave Iwo alive, publishes for the first time the defense plan and progress of the battle from the eyes of the Japanese defenders. His comments on Marine use of naval gunfire, close air support, and tanks is both interesting and informative. Maj Horie was captured on Chichi Jima in 1945 where he learned English from his captors.


Napoleon reputedly tested written orders on the most stupid man in his unit before publishing them. In the March issue we recommend *Readin', Ritin' and Regiments* for all personnel. It is an analysis of readability of current written orders.

**VOLUME 36, NUMBER 2.** Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Copyright 1952. Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Quantico, Va., under the act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 30 cents; subscription rate, \$3.00 a year. Subscriptions of all members or honorably discharged former members of the Armed Forces include membership in the Marine Corps Association. Articles, photographs, book reviews and letters of professional interest are invited. If accepted, these are paid for at prevailing space rates. Material may not be reproduced without written permission.



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TO THE EDITOR

# Message Center

## Bring Back The Para-Marines . . .



Dear Sir:

The Marine Corps has frequently been first in the field as far as development of new tactics is concerned. Take the development and perfection of amphibious landings, for example, or the employment of the four-man fire team.

One thing, however, has been sadly and unjustly neglected—the Para-Marines! Many have wondered why. It may be lack of appropriations or it may be caused by the apparent lack of success of the Para-Marines in WW II. Some may even think they were a failure, but were they? No! As a line outfit they saw action at Guadalcanal, Choiseul, and Bougainville, and by virtue of their superior training proved extremely useful. But still, that was the end of the illustrious Para-Marines; the idea, apparently, was scuttled and all that is left now are a few Marines scattered all over the world, who with a certain amount of nostalgia reminisce over what was and what could be—and eagerly await an ALMAR that the Para-Marines have been revived and volunteers are wanted. The Inchon landing proved that it is practicable to coordinate airborne warfare with amphibious assaults, but it is necessary to perfect the technique. The Marine Corps can do that, so why don't we do it?

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

Island warfare is not ideal for paratroopers—at least not in the Pacific where the majority of the islands are of volcanic origin with tropic vegetation, and consequently do not offer suitable drop zones. The main point is, though, that nobody can truthfully say that a third World War will only see Marines in the Pacific. The first World War saw Marines in Europe, a third might very well see Marines "Over There" again. They will as usual be the spearhead troops, the first wave that hits the beach, and here I venture to opine that an element of Para-Marines in Force Troops might prove invaluable.


Let us look at the conventional landing, similar to those seen in WW II. The enemy beach installations are under heavy naval gunfire, the famous umbrella that keeps the enemy pinned down while the assault troops are underway in the landing crafts. When they hit the beach the naval fire partly subsides.

The beach defense usually extends a few miles inland—hardly ever more than two or three, the majority of the defense is directed towards the sea, and the whole tactical picture is an invitation for a rear envelopment. By whom? The Para-Marines in Force Troops! They should be landed before, simultaneously with, or just after the first assault wave. Their task would be to distract the enemy by infiltrating the fortifications, by sabotage, harassing, and other subversive activities. Armed with rocket launchers they could ambush reinforcements, immobilize tanks, and indirectly render valuable assistance to the troops on the beach. The helicopter could here be used to land reinforcements, but first when the Para-Marines had consolidated, not before. Landed earlier in the picture there would be considerable risk of having them shot down by enemy anti-aircraft artillery.

It is my conception that a Hastings Fairchild at the moment is the plane most suited for the air drop and that the platoon should consist of two squads, each made up of two fire teams and likewise the company of four platoons plus H&S platoon, the battalion of two companies plus H&S company. The Thompson sub-machine gun could be used as T/O weapon (or possibly the new T-25 which, when demonstrated at the proving grounds, was said to have all the advantages of the M-1, the carbine, and the BAR). The men should be very carefully selected and be given a special Para-cum-Raider training with emphasis on guerrilla warfare.

NIELS QVISTGAARD,  
Cpl, USMC






### 1. Cute Baby

This is Betsy Helveston as she appeared in a telephone advertisement in 1940.



### 2. Big Girl Now

Here's Betsy as she is today. She's grown a lot and changed a lot in the last twelve years.



### 3. He's Bigger Too

In the last twelve years, the number of Bell telephones has been increased from 16,500,000 to 37,300,000.

## We've Been Growing Along With Betsy

While Betsy has been growing up, the telephone system has been growing too.

The figures are impressive. But far more important is what they mean in service to the people of this Nation.

Millions who never had telephones before now have them because the Bell System has added nearly 21,000,000 new telephones since January, 1940.

Business and industry are better able to serve the country because there are now more than three times as many Long Distance circuits.

The new coast-to-coast *Radio-Relay* system not only means better Long Distance service but also brings Television to millions more people.

Above all is the value of good telephone service to the productive capacity and security of the country. Nothing is more important to defense than quick, reliable communication.

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

UP FROM THE RANKS of heavy, cumbersome World War II Walkie-Talkies comes this lightweight Walkie-Talkie, the AN/PRC-10. It's only half the size and weight of its predecessor, yet has much greater power and twice the range...an outstanding contribution to the vital radio communications gear used by our armed forces.

In developing this new instrument for radiotelephone communication, Signal Corps engineers, RCA engineers, and our components' suppliers, working together, utilized every known technique to drastically reduce the size of parts. Condensers, tubes, resistors, hard-

ware and even wires were redesigned. The new and old Walkie-Talkies, pictured side by side (above, right), show the magnitude of size reduction.

Production of the AN/PRC-10 in quantity at the RCA Camden Plant marks a milestone in the miniaturization of electronic equipment. Moreover, this engineering achievement certainly will find application in other types of electronic equipment where size and weight are important factors.

It's an example of how RCA, through its extensive engineering and research facilities, is constantly striving to produce better equipment for the armed forces.



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## "Retreat" Is The Word . . .

Dear Sir:

It is with considerable pleasure that this writer finds the GAZETTE and other professional journals willing, at last, to use the words "retreat" and "evacuation" when referring to certain events in Korea. In one recent issue you even used the quotation, "The Marines know how to retreat."

For six months after my graduation from college last February, I edited a small daily newspaper. For the latter part of that period I must have worn out two or three copy pencils blacking our references to the "advance" from Changjin Reservoir to Hungnam and the "redeployment" from Hungnam in news copy received from official Army and Navy sources. "Retreat" and "evacuation" were the words and no graphite was spared in substituting them for the official terms.

There was no disgrace involved in either the Marine Corps' fighting retreat from Changjin Reservoir or in the precision and efficiency with which the Army and Navy evacuated X Corps from Hungnam. Disgrace was implied, however, by officers and public information staffs who attempted to becloud the events under the "advance" and "redeployment" fibs.

An informed American public sympathized with and applauded the efforts and virtues of the trapped Marines, Commandos, and infantrymen at Changjin long before the PIOs went to work.

WILLIAM V. KENNEDY,  
Mechanicsburg, Pa.

ED: Others may call the Chosin Reservoir action whatever they wish. Personally, we believe "Breakout" is a more accurate word to describe a march through five to seven enemy divisions, and so entitled the account of the action which appeared in the November GAZETTE.

## Poncho Sniped At Again . . .

Dear Sir:

Since my entrance into the Marine Corps on 30 January 1951, I have read your magazine with interest. I think it is an excellent magazine and enjoy it. Now, I find myself writing a letter to you, not with the idea of having it printed necessarily, but with the hope that perhaps my suggestion could be of some value to the Marine Corps.

I believe that the present day poncho is inadequate. I have worn it both as a Marine and as a Navy hospital corpsman when I was attached to the FMF during WW II. My







**Messenger of Mercy**—Carrying doctors and serum, a lone Sikorsky R-5 helicopter of the Air Rescue Service is credited with checking a yellow fever epidemic which was threatening to sweep Costa Rica last fall.

Operating from a makeshift base in the northern part of this Central American republic, the helicopter covered 6,000 square miles of remote territory in a 13-day period in good weather and bad.

During 42 landings, many of them in small tropical

clearings, doctors were able to inoculate 978 natives—and though 31 had perished before the helicopter flew in with medical aid, not a single death from the fever was recorded after its arrival.

Other peacetime missions performed in recent months by Sikorsky helicopters include the evacuation of 140 flood victims in Argentina . . . food air-drops in the Kansas City flood region . . . and help for flooded-out inhabitants of the Po River Valley in Italy.

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chief complaint is that it hits you right below the knees and, consequently, it drains rain water right down on your legs. I have often wondered why the Marine Corps couldn't institute foul weather gear similar to that of the Navy's. I have seen both sailors and, in civilian life, railroaders wear it and remain perfectly dry during inclement weather.

JOHN DONOVAN,  
PFC, USMCR

### Change the Man, Not the Uniform . . .

Dear Sir:

With regard to the article on ornaments, patches, and ties in the October issue, the writer suggests a collar ornament for officers' shirts. It would seem to me that if officers have in their possession the required articles of clothing there is no reason for a Marine officer being mistaken for an officer of some other branch of service. I certainly don't think this would happen on a post if the officer were in the uniform of the day because there is an ornament on his cap, and on liberty if he is appropriately dressed he has two additional ornaments on his coat. The writer of the referenced article states that it is now proper for officers to wear summer service without blouse. I assume that he means while on liberty, because I don't see how they could otherwise be mistaken for officers of other services. Well, it may be permitted in some places but



I still don't think it's proper in the U.S. and if an officer who owns a coat (or should anyway) goes out on liberty without it he should be embarrassed.

Shoulder patches were done away with for good logical reasons, so let's not drag them out again. If John Q. Public knows enough about ornaments, patches, etc. to recognize the old "RED 1," then I am sure that he will also recognize the blue ribbon worn by the 1st Mar Div boys back from Korea, so they are already appropriately marked as combat men without having to add on a shoulder patch.

Our officers and men on liberty reflect credit or discredit on the Corps and not on the unit that signed their liberty cards. We would do well to leave the uniform alone and work on the officers and men to insure that they wear the uniform properly.

CHARLES C. CRESAP,  
Capt, USMC





# Payday

## AT THE BLOOD BANK

From the home towns of America to the battle zones of Korea, our "Flying Lifeline" spans the Pacific ... precious pints of critically needed whole blood and plasma are speeded to our wounded combat forces via the Military Air Transport Service; then in a matter of hours ... in Fairchild C-119 Packets to the front lines.

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## Rifleman Neglected—I Disagree . . .

Dear Sir:

In a recent letter published in *Message Center*, 1stLt Henry J. Witkowski made a very broad and rash statement. This statement was to the effect that the rifleman has woefully been neglected and that very little if anything has been done to improve his individual equipment, clothing, and rations.

As a member of the Marine Corps Equipment Board I object to this implication and do herewith voice strong disagreement. To prove my point, I will list those articles Lt Witkowski complains about and the corrective action which has been, or is being taken by this board.

Complaint	Corrective Action
a. Canvas Leggings	What leggings? This board recommended a 10½-inch leather combat boot, which was adopted as standard Marine Corps issue on 1 July 1951. When present stocks of field shoes are exhausted, the new boot will be issued.
b. Dispatch Case	A plastic envelope map container for use with the dispatch case was tested by this board, approved, standardized, and will make its appearance in the supply system in the near future.
c. Bulky Rations	This board recently tested and recommended the Food Packet, Individual, Assault, 1A-1 for Marine Corps use. It is small (7 inches by 3-3/5 inches by 2-4/5 inches), compact (a single package), and lightweight (20 ounces). Each packet contains one of seven menus and an accessory packet, containing various required items, including a waterproof plastic bag and a chocolate chip cookie.
d. Mess Gear	A current project at this Board is the test of a mobile kitchen. The equipment is designed to provide hot meals for front line troops. If tests reveal the galley is suitable for Marine Corps use, the individual mess gear will be replaced with mess trays which are transported inside the galley.
e. Shelter Half, Poncho	This Board has recently completed tests of several types of packs and individual sleeping shelters, none of which was suitable replace-

ments for the standard articles. A new project is underway in which the entire problem of the rifleman and his burden is under study. Consideration will be given to the adoption of lightweight nylon materials in lieu of canvas and combining such articles as the poncho and the shelter half. This project will also include the study of pack equipment.

Although it wasn't mentioned, the M-1944 shoe pac was generally unsatisfactory. This item has been replaced with an insulated rubber boot which will keep the feet warm and comfortable at minus zero temperatures. The new boot has no visible innersoles and is worn with a single pair of cushion sole socks.

f. Shoe pac,  
Pack, etc.

As a fellow 0302, I am in sympathy with Lt Witkowski's basic thought to improve the equipment of the infantryman. As a member of the Marine Corps Development Center, I urge him and any others who may have constructive ideas regarding equipment to submit them to this center in accordance with the provisions of Marine Corps General Orders Nos. 22 and 89. In this manner the agency whose job it is to develop equipment will have available a broader concept on which to base its investigations.

ARDELL EBEL,  
Capt, USMC

## Give NAPs a Break . . .


Dear Sir:

There is a Marine Corps Memo 85-51 which carries the information on the appointment to the rank of second lieutenant (temporary) in the U. S. Marine Corps or U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, of enlisted NCOs and warrant officers. One of the following basic requirements is established:

3h. Commanding officers shall advise enlisted Naval Aviation pilots that, effective upon acceptance of temporary







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appointments to commissioned rank, their orders to duty involving flying will be revoked.

The enlisted pilot is in an odd situation. He can either give up his flight status or remain an enlisted man who has reached the limit of advancement. This means that he will be required to give up a job which he has been trained to perform for the past eight years or so. He will be giving up a trade which has cost the Marine Corps more money than was spent on nearly any other enlisted man. The enlisted pilot is in a position where he has a greater responsibility than nearly any other enlisted man. Most NAPs have a primary MOS of mechanic but their work is usually that of a pilot. There are few NAPs and it is a general feeling that they should be given an opportunity to earn a commission the same as other NCOs, but without the requirement that their hard-earned flight status be revoked. Let's have these men given just consideration. Their record is proof of their ability.

ELTON A. BARNUM,  
1stLt, USMC

#### "Ground Medal" . . .

Dear Sir:

In line with LtCol Penne's comments on medals, it is facetiously recommended that a "Ground Medal" be authorized in addition to the Air Medal.

This award could be based on the following quotation from



NAVPERS 15, 790 Decorations, Medals, Ribbons, and Badges of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard 1861-1948; section 15, paragraph (1):

" . . . . it is hereby ordered that an Air Medal, with accompanying ribbons, be established for award to any person, while serving in any capacity in or with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard of the United States subsequent to 8 September 1939, distinguishes, or has distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight."

Only the last two words need be altered to "ground assault."

The resulting Ground Medal could take precedence, as with the Air Medal, directly following the Bronze Star Medal.

CHARLES T. DOWDY,  
SSgt, USMC

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## Notes on Our Authors



Maj Yoshitaka Horie had authentic background for his information when he wrote *Japanese Defense of Iwo Jima*, which appears on page 18. The major was a general staff officer in the Imperial Japanese Army during the last war.

The son of a fisherman, Maj Horie was on his own in his military career. He was graduated from both the Japanese Military Academy and the War College, and served as liaison officer between the Japanese Army and Navy. His service included campaigns in China where he was wounded.

Maj Horie helped plan the defense of Iwo Jima under the late Gen Kuribayashi, after which he served on Chichi Jima where he learned English from American flyers shot down there. At present, he is a representative for the Tachihi Industrial Co., Ltd.

In the December GAZETTE (page 58) MSgt Clayton R. Barrow, Jr., wrote the article entitled, *Find the Gimmicks*. From our files we have learned of the sergeant's varied career in artillery, administration, plans and training, and overseas (WW II) with the 1st Mar Div and 1st Mar Amphib Corps. MSgt Barrow has also served in Intelligence, has taken part in maneuvers in the Caribbean, and has "done much guard duty." At present, he is a combat artist with the 1st Mar Div in Korea.



1stLt Brian J. Quirk tells us on page 15 why *You Can't Make Them Drink*. In December 1941, Lt Quirk entered the Corps, and joined the Raiders two months later. He served one year each with the 1st and 3d Raider Bns.


1stLt Quirk accepted his commission at PCS in May 1945. He has received the Navy Cross and other awards, including two Purple Hearts. At present, he is ExO of Fox Co, 6th Marines.

The lieutenant is a graduate of Loyola University (Chicago), majoring in commerce and law.




On page 42, Maj Donald W. Swanson contributes his article entitled, *If You Weren't Selected*. The major has had continuous service since 'way back in 1919. Mare Island, the *USS Mississippi*, Peking, San Francisco, Atlanta, Camp Elliott, and "from Camp Pendleton to Japan and way points" have all been his posts of duty at one time or another. At the outbreak of WW II, Maj Swanson was at Pearl Harbor.

Simultaneously with these busy years, the major has completed several MCI courses as well as contributing articles to various publications.



Has any reader ever wondered under what classification he would place the helicopter? He will find food for thought in the article on page 46, wherein LtCol Ralph M. Wismer writes a puzzler entitled, *What is the Helicopter?*

Col Wismer served his first hitch in the Corps in the early 1930s, later accepting his commission in 1939. Since then he has served in several Marine regiments, including the 5th and 7th as well as in other units in the 1st Mar Div. From May to November 1945, Col Wismer served with the 6th Mar Div and 3d Amphib Force successively. Since WW II his duty stations have included Great Lakes, Pacific Fleet, Plans and Policies, and T & T Board, LFDC.



A former Marine writes the article, *Red China's Three Top Field Commanders*, appearing on page 54. During his service in WW II, Gene Z. Hanrahan served in the 3d Mar Div in the Pacific, and in China with the 1st Mar Div.

A graduate student at Columbia at present, Mr Hanrahan is writing his thesis on the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Red Army (1927-1945). He is also engaged in putting out "a tentative mimeographed source book on Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics, including a group of translations and summary translations of Chinese guerrilla texts."







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# YOU CAN'T MAKE THEM DRINK



*By 1stLt Brian J. Quirk*

✻ "THE AGGRESSIVE, INTELLIGENT, AND EFFECTIVE employment of the squad in combat is the primary basis for success in battle."

The above excerpt is from Field Manual NAVMC 1046-DEP. It reminds every company commander and platoon commander that he must train and develop his squad leaders and fire team leaders to be capable combat leaders. We all recognize this responsibility as paramount.

We know from personal experience that the NCO can be taken to the point where his independent responsibility starts, but here the officer must turn him to on his own. For the NCO is the direct leader of the men who close with and kill the enemy, and the man to whom the platoon leader issues paragraph three of his combat order.

Every company commander and platoon leader knows that the junior NCOs are the cornerstone of a rifle com-



pany. A company without capable squad leaders and fire-team leaders is like a saw without teeth. These squad leaders must be trained to be successful. The junior officers must equip them for combat, mentally and physically. They must help them develop the necessary qualities to meet the test. The time to develop the necessary qualities starts with the first day of the training schedule. It never ends.

What qualities are desirable in the junior NCO? His knowledge of the military profession should be as complete as his powers of absorption allow. The junior NCO should know how to employ the unit he is responsible for. He should know the job of every man he commands. He should know all the phases of combat from scouting and patrolling to the principles to be used by a small unit attacking a fortified position. He should know the function and employment of weapons. Without this knowledge the NCO will not be able to execute his duties. The platoon leader must be sure that his NCOs have this technical know-how.

In addition to this technical knowledge, the NCO must know how to handle men. To be really effective the NCO must have a basic knowledge of psychology. Why will the men do something eagerly for one leader and begrudgingly for another? This is the question he should be able to answer. The NCO must, moreover, understand the part discipline and *esprit de corps* play in his role as a leader.

Another important point under handling men is the NCO's ability to evaluate as closely as possible the capabilities of his men. When the NCO can do this, he can accurately determine the value to the command of each subordinate. He can then give the platoon leader a true picture of the man's assets and shortcomings. Thus, the platoon leader gets a good first-hand, everyday observation of his men, and, as a result, knows where his platoon is weak and where it is strong. He knows, then, where he must concentrate his training effort. This ability of the NCO to evaluate his men is also important in combat, for many times the NCO must pick the right man for the right combat job.



**A fire team or squad leader doesn't become a leader overnight. He needs the guidance and help of his platoon commander if he is to take a place in the chain of command.**

The next general quality to be discussed is leadership. Certainly, it is a quality that an NCO must have. He can be somewhat short on other qualities and maybe slip through the gate, but leadership he must have.

What is leadership? Why will men follow some men willingly and walk with another begrudgingly? The answers to both of these questions are certainly not stereotyped or definite, but certain conclusions can be reached.

First, let us start with a workable definition of what leadership is. It may be defined as the ability to inspire confidence and respect from subordinates. Now, let us look at some of the qualities that lead to competent leadership.

❖ **FIRST, THE ATTITUDE** of wanting to do the job the right way, the desire to be a leader, must exist if strong leadership is to exist. The fact that the man is the smartest individual in the company is of no help if he will not put the knowledge to use. Before he can start developing other leadership qualities, the junior officer must be sure that the NCO has the proper attitude. The NCO must want to lead.

Next, impressions are sometimes lasting, and always important, so command presence is extremely important. Command presence is composed of many things. The way a man talks, the way he walks, the way he holds a cigarette. Primarily, command presence can be broken down into three elements—posture, appearance, and force.

Military posture is a very important asset to any military leader, because it is the first thing that the men see and consequently puts the superior off to a good or a bad start. It does not stretch our imagination to understand that an order delivered by a man with poise and precision carries a much heavier weight of confidence and authority than an order given by a man with a slipshod manner. As a consequence, the order will be carried out as effectively as the deliverer's bearing has impressed the recipient. Appearance has the same effect on subordinates as posture does. A man who is neat and clean inspires his subordinates to respect and imitate their leader.

❖ **FORCE IS SOMETHING** that cannot be measured by the strength of a man's voice or the size of his muscles, though this kind of force is sometimes necessary when the troops are in need of being instructed as to who is the boss. This occasion presents itself when it is ascertained that the situation is not going according to plan and order has to be restored, or when it is plain that one of the sheep is getting ready to jump the fence. However, the leader should never lose sight of the fact that constant bullying by voice and muscle is a very quick way of destroying the respect of men.

The NCO must have the mental courage to make decisions. Yet, his decisions must be tempered with an



awareness of where he fits into the picture, where his authority stops. This is a precarious problem that the junior officer must face. He has to develop the NCO's ability to make decisions by giving him problems to solve, but still keep the NCO on his own level of decision-making.

Initiative is something that the NCO must have. The junior officer could never do his own job if he had to set out all the details of his orders. The NCO must be able to see what the situation lacks and take steps to bring it under control. Initiative is the difference between a robot and a man capable of thinking soundly on his own two feet. The junior officer who has an NCO with initiative has much less to worry about than an officer with a robot NCO.

The last quality of leadership is sound judgment. This is something that the junior officer must develop by constant supervision and instruction. It is more of a problem with the junior NCOs because as a rule they are young and without experience to mellow their judgment, and they have a tendency to be impetuous. The junior officer must be on the alert to control this impetuosity.

In addition to leading men, an NCO must be able to discipline them. Discipline is necessary to any military organization. It is the governing hand that guides the direction of leadership. It produces the ideal condition, controlled, yet independent and unified thought. It might be defined as that condition which exists when one man's thoughts are transposed into action by the combined efforts of all subordinates. Discipline, the junior NCO must have. He must respect his superiors and earn the respect of his men. He must realize that his position is likened to standing between his father and his son. He owes and he receives. Discipline is a two-way proposition.

THE JUNIOR OFFICER must saddle the NCO with increasing responsibilities, guided by the proper relationship of the NCO's status to officer and private alike. Responsibility has certainly made more men than it has broken. It causes the subject to sink or swim. It is probably the one essential, sure-fire method of developing an individual. If it fails to deliver a finished product, especially in the military, the time to find this out is in the training period—when no lives will be lost. Responsibility builds confidence, affects proficiency, and develops leaders.

Close order drill can be used effectively to develop responsibility. The ability to drill troops demands a composite of control, poise, force, and precision. It trains the NCO to expect perfection and obedience. It instills in troops the concept of obedience and precision in relation to their conduct to the NCO. When the NCO is accustomed to giving orders in close order drill, it is that much easier to give orders in extended order exercises.

Instruction, another responsibility builder, demands that a man have detailed knowledge of his subject. More-

over, giving instruction forces a man to think under pressure, to express his ideas, and to develop his self-confidence to the point of command presence during his instruction. It is certainly a method of separating the men from the boys.

Another excellent method of developing responsibility in NCOs is giving them charge of working parties. Here, the NCO is given an assignment, and is expected to deliver the goods. Everything in between the order and the execution is the NCO's responsibility. In executing a working party order the NCO develops his ability to handle men, to analyze a problem, to make a decision, and to supervise and guide a coordinated effort to the good of the mission.

Finally, field problems are necessary to the development of responsibility. It is in these problems that the NCO meets the concrete challenge to his ability in his own specific field. Here the NCO learns to test his judgment, to use his initiative, to develop the ability to make correct decisions with time and men running against him. Here he displays his leadership qualities under adverse conditions. At this time the platoon leader can observe whether the NCO has the ability to "strangle" a situation that is getting out of hand. It is certainly fair to assume that any man who can not measure up to the necessary standards on a "dummy run," will definitely not meet the requirements of combat. In short, this is an excellent time to evaluate the overall ability of the NCO.


IN THIS DEVELOPMENT of NCOs the one big danger that junior officers must constantly guard against is doing the NCO's job. The NCO must be made aware of his relationship to his officer and to his men. This cannot be completely realized if the officer issues his order to the NCO and then goes ahead to do the job of the NCO. The NCO becomes disgruntled, indifferent, and does not attempt to develop himself when the officer does his work. An order should be given with the latitude that compels the NCO to do his own thinking and to execute his task with instilled confidence. Let the NCO work out his own problem. This does not mean, however, the abandonment of supervision and coaching by the officer. When the training period is over, the officer must know that he and his NCOs think with one mind and that when he issues an order it will be executed by the NCO to the smallest detail.

In conclusion, it remains with the junior officer whether or not he will have good or bad NCOs to help him control his platoon in combat. If he will realize the importance of teaching and developing his NCOs while in training, he need not worry about their ultimate performance. On the other hand, the junior officer who sees his NCOs as just bodies to fill out his unit, had better stand by for trouble when his platoon runs into its first firefight.

USMC



# Japanese Defense of IWO JIMA



"The best plan is to sink this island in the sea . . ." — Y. Horie.

---

Less than a year after the bloody fight for Iwo Jima, a Japanese officer, imprisoned on Chichi Jima, used his newly-learned English to write about the battle. This is his story



By Y. Horie, former major, Imperial Japanese Army

## I. Preface

BY THE KIND ADVICE OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER, I will state the outline of the Japanese defense plan and battle of Iwo Jima. To tell the truth, I have a very deep impression in regard to this problem because I was concerned with the defense plan of Iwo Jima and especially devoted my body and soul to its supply under my respectful LtGen Kuribayashi.

Every day after the American forces landed on Iwo Jima on the 19th of February 1945, I wrote on my map all battle reports communicated from Iwo Jima, studying the tactics and noting my opinion of them. But I am very sorry to say I burnt all of them when Iwo Jima fell and I have to pick it out from my poor memory.

I am unable to state my opinions without rending my heart to the many officers and men of Japan and America who sacrificed their lives.

I express my grateful thanks to Col Rixey, island commander of American occupation forces, Chichi Jima, and Capt Kusilak, his staff officer, for their helpful criticism to my booklet.

## II. General Situation

*A. History of Iwo Jima*—About 70 years ago Iwo Jima became the territory of Japan with Chichi Jima and Haha Jima. But we had no special product on this island and it had been written down in the geographical book as an island of sulfur springs, no water, no sparrow, and no swallow. And it was indeed after Truk Island was raided by an American Task Force in February, 1944, and our Grand Fleet retired from there, that we (except several officers) began to think much of this island in connection with our strategy.


*B. Situation of Spring, 1944*—In 1943, our Navy constructed the first airfield (near Mt. Suribachi) on Iwo Jima and made it an intermediate aircraft base from Japan to the Marianas, and used it also as an aircraft base for our convoy strategy. In February, 1944 we had only 1,500 Naval Air Forces men and 20 aircraft on the island. From February to March, Japanese Imperial Headquarters increased the strength on Iwo Jima to 3,000 Army and 2,000 Navy. In those days the Army

was under command of the Chichi Jima fortress and the Navy was under the command of the Yokohka Air Force.

*C. Situation of Summer and Autumn, 1944*—From March to June, Japanese Imperial Headquarters had sent about 10 divisions to the Middle Pacific area and especially did their best to strengthen Saipan, Guam, and Palau and endeavored to reestablish our Great Fleet. On the other hand Japanese Imperial Headquarters came to recognize the value of Iwo Jima and began to study what influence this isolated island would have on the mainland of Japan if the Marianas fell to the enemy's hand. From March to June the Chichi Jima fortress commander was under the command of the 31st Army on Saipan, and the Army and Navy in the Bonin Islands were under the single control of the fortress commander.


June 15th, American forces landed on Saipan and on the 19th our Great Fleet was defeated by the American 5th Fleet 270 sea miles north of Yap Island. Japanese Imperial Headquarters gave up their plan of repossessing Saipan and determined to reenforce Iwo Jima with a part of this repossessing strength.

On the 15th of June about 100 of our naval aircraft were defeated by the first American air raids on Iwo Jima. In those days we did not have any strong defense



RIGHT: (top) One of hundreds of pillboxes Japanese constructed on Iwo. (bottom) Five-inch dual-purpose gun positioned to fire on targets in the air or on the water.





As early as 1937, Japanese realized the strategic importance of Iwo Jima, as evidenced by this sign discovered on the island by the Marine landing force.

fortifications on this island and it was as hazardous to be on as a pile of eggs. At that time if American forces had assaulted Iwo Jima it would have been completely occupied in two or three days.

On the 30th of June, Japanese Imperial Headquarters activated the 109th Division, appointed LtGen Kuribayashi as the divisional commander, and put him under the direct command of the Imperial Headquarters. I, who had been concerned in the plan of repossessing Saipan as a staff officer of the 31st Army, became on this same day a staff officer of LtGen Kuribayashi. At the end of June, the Navy created the 3d Aircraft Fleet at Kisarazu and brought the air forces of Iwo Jima under the command of this fleet as the 27th Air Forces.

We planned to send the following Army strength (total—about 14,000 men) to Iwo Jima from Chichi Jima after July:

- 145th Infantry Regt
- 3d Bn, 17th Mixed Regt
- 26th Tank Regt
- 4 Independent Anti-tank Gun Bns
- 2 Independent Machine Gun Bns
- 2 25mm Machine Gun Cos
- 1 Mortar Co

- 1 Rocket Gun Co
- 1 Assault Co
- Other Units

But enemy disturbances by air forces and submarines were severe and we had bad weather many times, so the transportation of this strength by sea was delayed and continued to be delayed to the very time American forces landed on Iwo Jima. The Navy also increased its strength on Iwo Jima by crushing many difficulties. LtGen Kuribayashi placed the detached headquarters of the division of Chichi Jima with Maj Horie the head of it, and put him in charge of transportation, supply, and communication.

### III. Chief Persons

A. *LtGen Kuribayashi*—Graduated Military Academy and Military College, cavalry officer. Stayed in Canada for two years, had a long service in the War Office, and was mostly appointed as staff officer. He was a poet and wrote *Aiba Koshin Kyoku* (A song of loving horses) and *Aikoku Koshin Kyoku* (a song of loving his nation).

At Iwo Jima, one night, I talked with him thoroughly and he told me as follows:

"When I was in Canada, I went to the United States and saw many factories. I pay my respects to the greatness of American mass production. I think that 'Victory or Defeat' of this war will be decided by production power. Don't you think so?"

B. *MajGen Osuga* (Ex-Commander of 2d Mixed Brigade)—Graduated Military Academy and Military College, artillery officer. Appointed as the Chichi Jima fortress commander in March, 1944, from Kyurun fortress commander. Appointed as commander of the 2d Mixed Brigade on the 30th of June when the 109th Division was formed. In December, entered field hospital at Iwo Jima, suffering from paratyphus. Had gentle and quiet personality.

C. *MajGen Senda*, (Commander of 2d Mixed Brigade)—Appointed as the commander of the 2d Mixed Brigade, as successor to MajGen Osuga, from commander of Sendai Reserve Military Academy. Graduated Military Academy. Served in Infantry School for Non-Commissioned Officers, etc. Had experience as infantry regimental commander. Well acquainted with infantry battle.

4. *Col Hori* (Ex-Chief of Staff)—Graduated Military Academy and special course of Military College. Had experience as teacher at Military Academy, as infantry regimental commander, and as Chief of Staff of the Homeland Division. Appointed as Chief of Staff of the 109th Division on 30th of June. Was discharged from this position and was attached to the 2d Mixed Brigade headquarters in December, 1944. Had gentle and quiet personality.

5. *Col Takaishi* (Chief of Staff)—Graduated Military



Academy and special course of Military College, infantry officer. Appointed as the successor of Col Hori in December, 1944. Well acquainted with infantry battle, very energetic, and was a poet.

6. *LtCol Nishi* (Commander of 26th Tank Regt)—Baron, cavalry officer, a champion of Olympic horse games.

7. *Staff Officers* (from old to young by age)—LtCol Nakane, operations staff; LtCol Nishikawa, supply staff; Maj Yoshida, fortification staff; Maj Yamanonchi, intelligence staff, and Maj Horie, head of the Chichi Jima detached headquarters.

8. *RAdm Ichimaru* (Commander of 27th Air Forces)—Graduated Naval Academy. Famous pilot of Navy Air Forces.

9. *Naval Staff Officers*—Comdr Mase, senior and operations staff; LtComdr Okazaki, supply staff; and LtComdr Akada, defense staff.

#### IV. Defense Plan of Iwo Jima

A. *Discussions regarding the defense plans of Iwo Jima*—Iwo Jima was very near to the mainland of Japan and was able to hold many aircraft. We thought much about this island and discussed the value of it many times at Tokyo and Iwo Jima.

First, at Iwo Jima some officers said, "We will not be left as an isolated force, we can keep on fighting, expecting the assistance of air forces and fleets from the main-

land of Japan. So the plan should be an offensive defense."

At Tokyo, some officers said, "We must make a plan of how to use this Iwo Jima and need not be anxious about the fall of Iwo Jima."


At that time, I, Maj Horie, was one of the officers who observed the situation in this war most pessimistically and insisted on my opinion as follows:

Now we have no fleet and no airforces. If American forces will assault this island it will fall into their hands in one month. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary not to let the enemy use this island. The best plan is to sink this island in the sea or cut the island in half. At least we must endeavor to sink the first airfield. In the future, if by any chance we have an opportunity to take an offensive step again in the Pacific area, we will not use Iwo Jima.

At the General Staff Office and the Naval Staff Office there were some officers who had the same ideas. Especially one staff officer asked me to calculate the necessary explosive quantity to sink Iwo Jima. LtGen Kuriyashiki also concurred with me, but in September, 1944 he inspected the whole island of Iwo Jima with me and investigated how to dispose of this island, and we found out that the disposition of this island was quite impossible and we should make this island much stronger by fortification.

However, we had the same idea that even if we placed

TOP: (left to right) LtGen Tadamichi Kuribayashi. MajGen Sadasue Senda. RAAdm Toshinosuke Ichimaru. BOTTOM: (left to right) Col Tadashi Takaishi. LtCol Takeichi Nishi, as a first lieutenant. 2dLt Hiroshi Murakawa, CO of the Special Charge (antitank) Unit





any strength on the first airfield it would immediately be defeated by the enemy under his severe bombardment of airforces and vessels, and it would be better not to place any strength on this airfield. Later, one staff officer of the 3d Aircraft Fleet came to Iwo Jima and insisted on giving many 25mm machine guns and materials from the Navy in order to make many pillboxes around the first airfield.

At first, LtGen Kuribayashi did not agree with him, but later he came to concur with him. And in October he ordered the pillboxes made, using several battalions every day, and after three months he had 135. When American forces landed on Iwo Jima all of them were barely completed. In fact, this airfield was trodden by American forces in only two days. If we had infused this great strength, many materials, and three months of labor which were used on the airfield, into the defense of Motoyama district and Mt Suribachi, we could have been able to make these areas much stronger.


B. *Our judgment regarding the enemy's plan*—We got various information that many American vessels were gathering at Ulithi, Guam, and Saipan from the end of January, 1945, and we thought at Tokyo and Iwo Jima that American forces would land on Iwo Jima or Okinawa. In my opinion, the possibility of landing of American forces at Iwo Jima was 40 per cent and at Okinawa 60 per cent. We thought that if American forces landed on Iwo Jima they would occupy the first airfield and make an offensive base there and use many tanks. Therefore, we endeavored especially to strengthen the defenses of Mt. Suribachi and the front of Minamiburaku, Tankuiwa, and Osakayama while emphasizing training for antitank battle.

C. *Discussions regarding the location of the 109th Division headquarters*—Many officers insisted that since Iwo Jima was the first front line it would be better to let the 2d Brigade commander be island commander. And that the divisional commander should stay at Chichi Jima where it was convenient to control the supply and communications of all the Bonin Islands. But Vice Chief of Staff Gen Ushiroku and LtGen Kuribayashi said,

"Iwo Jima is the most important island and the enemy will surely come to get it, so we should place the divisional headquarters at Iwo Jima." And LtGen Kuribayashi determined to place the detached headquarters at Chichi Jima in order to supply and communicate with each island.

D. *Changes of plan and execution of defensive dispositions*—Until October, 1944, we had a plan not to place any strength on the first airfield, but because of the above mentioned reason, we changed our plan and placed there two battalions.

E. *A problem of how the Army and Navy should be disposed*—The Army had the opinion that they should be disposed for defense all over the island and that naval



Concrete underground shelter on Iwo Jima was some Japanese naval officer's "home away from home."

troops should be disposed under the control of each district Army commander. But the Navy was very anxious to defend one district by itself and insisted that it would be better to make plans for mutual understanding, strengthening our union, and displaying fighting power. So the main power of the Navy was put in charge of the defense of the Minamiburaku district and the Army was put in charge of the defense of all the rest of the island.

F. *The defense plan of LtGen Kuribayashi*—In June, 1944, the plan was to strengthen the Motoyama and Mt Suribachi districts and especially to hold a big reserve (including the 26th Tank Regt), and if the enemy landed on the first airfield to make offensive operations towards seaside and annihilate the enemy. In January, 1945, the plan was changed to having each man think of his defense position as his graveyard, to fight until the last, and to give many damages to the enemy.

G. *Discussions regarding the value of antiaircraft*—I insisted upon this problem as follows:

We should change our plan to use most of the anti-aircraft guns as artillery and to retain a very small part of them as anti-aircraft guns. Anti-aircraft guns are good to protect disclosed targets, especially ships, but are worthless for the covering of land defenses.

But the opinion of the staff officers of Iwo Jima have inclined as follows:

At Iwo Jima it is best to use anti-aircraft guns as artillery and as anti-aircraft guns. And as the natural features of Iwo Jima are weaker than those of Chichi Jima, if we have no anti-aircraft guns, our defensive positions will be completely destroyed by the enemy's air raids.

And so most of the 300 anti-aircraft guns were used in both senses mentioned above. But later when American



forces landed on Iwo Jima, these antiaircraft guns were put to silence in one or two days. And we had evidence that antiaircraft guns were not valuable. But the 7.5cm antiaircraft guns, prepared as antitank guns, were very valuable.

**H. Fortification of an underground tunnel**—In order to connect with each defense position in the Motoyama district, we planned to make 28,000 meters of underground tunnel and began this work in December, 1944. But by the time American forces landed on Iwo Jima we had only finished 5,000 meters.

**I. Training for battle**—LtGen Kuribayashi insisted on emphasizing training in (1) Bodily attacks against enemy tanks, (2) Cutting-in attacks, and (3) Sniping. He had special badges made for the men in charge of bodily attack against enemy tanks, and the men in charge of cutting-in attacks.

Dummy Japanese tank, carved from soft volcanic stone, drew considerable fire from our tanks and antitank guns.



## V. Strength, Arms, and Ammunition on 1 February 1945

Strength	23,000 (17,500 Army; 5,500 Navy)	
Arms	No. of Arms	Ammunition (Rounds)
Big guns (more than 7.5cm)	120	100,000
Antiaircraft guns (more than 25mm mg)	300	Each gun 500
Small guns (including all machine guns)	20,000	22,000,000
Howitzers (8cm, 12cm)	130	Each howitzer 90
Mortars (20cm)	20	Each mortar 40
Rocket guns (20cm)	70	Each gun 50
Antitank guns (47mm)	40	Each gun 600
Antitank guns (37mm)	20	Each gun 500
Tanks	27	

## VI. Situation of Supply

**A. System of supply**—The Army and Navy both used two systems; (1) Tokyo—Iwo Jima, by destroyer, high-speed transport, and SB (something like the American LST but smaller in size); (2) Tokyo—Chichi Jima—Iwo Jima, by ship and/or high speed transport and then by sailing boat, fishing boat, or SB. Most transportation belonged to the latter system.

**B. Damages of Ships**—Especially after August, 1944, the power of American airforces and submarines was very severe and from Tokyo to Chichi Jima, to Futami Ko, and especially from Chichi Jima to Iwo Jima, we had many damages. We lost on the sea more than 1500 men and 50,000 tons of material.

**C. Work of loading and unloading at Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima**—When materials were sent to Chichi Jima from the mainland of Japan, we unloaded them on Omura during darkness and the intermissions from the enemy's air raids. The supplies were dispersed to the interior of the island. They were sent to Iwo Jima by sailing boats and fishing boats. This was very hard work and many times we used 2000 men and 50 trucks a whole day without sleeping or resting. No harbor, rough waves, and severe air raids gave the greatest hindrance to the unloading work at Iwo Jima. At Iwo Jima, we could not leave landing craft on the sea, so when we finished unloading we had to pull them up on the land.

**D. Supply crisis of November, 1944, and the supply situation in February**—In November, 1944, we had only 30-day supply of grain and 15-day supply of supplementary food, and we came to a very dangerous situation. But afterwards, we were able to increase the food a little by brave and self-sacrificing transportation. By February 1, 1944 Army and Navy had on hand on Iwo Jima about a 70-day supply of grain and 60-day supply of supplementary food.

## VII. Supply Convoy Strategy

Until June of 1944, American aircraft did not come to the Chichi Jima area, so we only thought of anti-submarine convoys. Namely, our transports were protected primarily by our destroyers or coast defense ships with a little assistance from aircraft at Tateyama, Hachijyo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Iwo Jima. After June, American aircraft started attacking our transports in this area and we were obliged to use night transportation and night work, and, to protect our ships, we were forced to send one Army aircraft squadron to Iwo Jima. I experienced bitterly how miserable our transportation by sea was when the air was in the hands of the enemy.

## VIII. Everyday Life of the Iwo Jima Garrison

Officers and men of Iwo Jima were suffering from lack of water. They gathered rain water in empty barrels and



used it. As they were unable to take baths because of the water shortage, they were obliged to go to Kitawaihan to take hot sulfur-spring baths. I also went to that hot spring once. There were no fresh vegetables, and many had malnutrition and paratyphus. And in those days, I think, 20 per cent of the whole troops were patients.

### IX. Battle

A. *Landing operations of the American forces on the first airfield and our battle*—On the 19th of February American forces landed on the first airfield under cover of their keen bombardments by aircraft and warships. Although their landing direction, strength, and fighting methods were the same as our judgment, we could not take any countermeasures toward them. The 135 pill-boxes we had at the first airfield were trodden down and occupied only two days after their landing. We shot them bitterly with the artillery we had at Motoyama and Mt. Suribachi, but the guns were immediately destroyed by the enemy's counterfiring. At that time we had many opportunities to make offensive attacks against the enemy, but we knew well that if we did we would suffer many damages from American bombardments of aircraft and vessels. Therefore, our officers and men waited for the enemy to come closer to their own positions.

B. *Fall of Mt. Suribachi*—We were very discouraged when we heard of the fall of Mt. Suribachi after only three days' fighting. I received the telegram at Chichi Jima from Iwo Jima that the district commander of Mt. Suribachi had informed LtGen Kuribayashi that "enemy's bombardments from air and sea and their assaults with explosions are very fierce and if we try to stay and defend our present position it will lead us to self-destruction.

We would rather like to go out of our position and choose death by 'banzai' charge." I was bursted with emotion. I knew about the fall of the first airfield, but I never thought of losing Mt. Suribachi in only three days.

C. *The American M-4 Tank*—When the American M-4 tank appeared in front of Osakayama, LtGen Kuribayashi was very anxious to know how to dispose of this tank. Even our 47mm antitank gun could not destroy it, and he at last came to the conclusion that bodily attacks with explosives was the only way to destroy it.

D. *Value of bombardment by American airforces and vessels*—LtGen Kuribayashi informed Tokyo by wireless that he was not afraid of the fighting power of only three American Marine divisions if there were no bombardment from aircraft and warships. This was the only reason why we have to see such miserable situations.

E. *Battle command of LtGen Kuribayashi*—LtGen Kuribayashi was usually at his commanding place in the cave. As soon as his staff officers composed telegrams, using the information that came into their hands from time to time from all troops, he inspected, revised, and ordered them dispatched. As he was very skillful in making compositions, his telegrams made all Japanese weep in those days.

F. *Value of cutting-in (infiltration) attacks*—At first we received information that our cutting-in attacks were giving great damage to the enemy. But early in March the information sent to Tokyo by wire was that "The lookout of American forces has become very strict and it is difficult to pass through their guarded line. Don't overestimate the value of cutting-in attacks."



G. *Supply from Japan by aircraft*—I pay many respects to the brave aviators who supplied weapons to Iwo

Jima by aircraft. They made arrangements with the Iwo Jima commander and started from Hamamatsu (Japan) airfield and supplied hand grenades and flame projectors. It is indeed difficult to express how the hearts of the fighting youth of Iwo Jima were, as they stood before their death, when they saw these brave flyers.

H. *Desperate fight of the Army and Navy*—According to the telegraphic reports of LtGen Kuribayashi, we have knowledge of the following desperate fights:

1. *7th March*—All troops of Tamanayama district are fighting desperately, facing

BELOW: (left) Computer and director used to fire dual-purpose battery on Iwo Jima. (right) Japanese observation post with ceiling constructed from Japanese plane wings.





the enemy at only 80-meters distance. Seven small units sent for cutting-in attack from Tamanayama on the 6th night are not back yet and results are unknown.

2. *8th March, 1000*—Today, from 0630, the enemy has been attacking the Northern district. His bombardments from mortars and warships are very severe. Several troops of the enemy are advancing toward Naval Headquarters hill (near Kitburaku) and Hyoriuboku. All surviving fighting bases have sustained heavy losses, but their fighting spirits are running high and they are giving great damages to the enemy.

3. *8th March, 1800*—Troops at Tamanayama and Northern districts are still holding their positions thoroughly and continue giving damages to the enemy. Their fighting spirit, believing in their country's victory, looks god-like.

4. *8th March, 2000*—I am very sorry that I have let the enemy occupy one part of Japanese territory, but I am taking comfort in giving great damages to the enemy.

5. *10th March, 1930*—Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly. Divisional radio station was fighting under the siege of many enemy troops from the 8th, but finally had to destroy the radio-telegraph today at 1130. Two hundred or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attached, attacked Tenzan all day; the enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft were very severe. The bombing and machine gun firing against divisional headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers was so fierce that I cannot express nor write it here. Before American forces landed on Iwo Jima there were many trees around my headquarters, but now there is not even a grasp of grass remaining. The surface of the earth has changed completely and we can see numerous holes of bombardment.

6. *10th March, 2000*—At Tamanayama the 2d Mixed Brigade headquarters has become dangerous and they might have gone out for a 'banzai' charge at midnight on the 8th, because we cannot contact them after that time.

7. *11th March, 1050*—Surviving strength of Northern districts (Army and Navy) is 1500 men. On the 9th we gave the enemy losses of 798 men and one tank.



Five-inch gun emplacement with reinforced overhead cover.

8. *11 March, 1400*—On the 8th, one M-4 tank stopped on the rugged ground of the Northern district and one man tried to go out from the canopy. Just at that time, Superior Private Goudo sniped him, threw a hand grenade into the tank, and burnt it. We cannot contact the commander of Tamanayama district since yesterday. This morning the enemy began to concentrate their shooting of warships, firing of mortars and heavy artillery, and bombing of aircraft on the Northern district.

9. *13th March, 0800*—By captured documents we found out that the enemy is the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, and that the 5th Division is now in the Tensan area. On the 12th we gave the enemy the following losses in the Northern district alone: one aircraft shot down and 200 men killed.

10. *14th March, 1500*—The attack on the Northern district this morning was much more severe than before, and at about noon one part of the enemy with about 10 tanks broke through our left front line and approached to 200 meters east of the divisional headquarters.

11. *15th March, 0800*—To: Chichi Jima Signal Corps Commander; From: Iwo Jima Signal Corps Commander; Situation is very dangerous. Do your best to contact us. Present strength of the Northern district is about 900 men.

12. *15 March, 0930*—Since the 10th, main power of the 26th Tank Regiment and one part of the Navy (about 300 men altogether) near Manburaku have repulsed the enemy several times.

13. *16th March, 0800*—Our surviving strength is now 500 men in the Northern district and 300 men in the Eastern district.

14. *17th March, 0200*—From: LtGen Kuribayashi;



To: All surviving officers and men; The battle situation has come to the last moment. I want my surviving officers and men to go out and attack the enemy till the last. You have devoted yourself to His Majesty, The Emperor. Do not think of yourself. I am always at the head of you all.

15. 17th March, 0500—The 145th Infantry Regiment fought bravely near Hyoriuboku, holding their Regimental Flag in the center. The last telegram sent to me on the 15th was as follows: "Here we burnt our brilliant Regimental Flag completely, Goodbye. . ."

16. 21st March, 1200—At midnight on the 17th I went out of my cave and gathered all survivors of the 145th Infantry Regiment, Tamanayama, Northern, Eastern, and Western districts, westward of Kitaburaku and we are continuing fighting. I have 400 men under my control. The enemy besieged us and on the 18th and 19th approached us by firing and flame of their tanks. Especially they are trying to approach the entrance to our cave with explosives.

17. 21st March, 1300—My officers and men are still fighting. The enemy's front line is 200 or 300 meters from us, and they are attacking by tank-firing. They advised us to surrender by a loud speaker, but we only laughed at this childish trick and did not set ourselves against them.

18. 22d March, 0910—Divisional commander, officers, and men are continuing fighting.

1. *The last moments of LtGen Kuribayashi*—LtGen Kuribayashi commanded his battle under the candle lights without having a single rest nor sleep day after day. Radio broadcasts, newspapers, and magazines of Japan encouraged him thoroughly. Especially, old and young men, boys and girls of his native place, prayed God for his victory. On the 14th of March, *Song of Iwo Jima*, composed by the fighting men of Iwo Jima before the American forces landed, was broadcast to LtGen Kuribayashi, his officers and men from Tokyo, and he sent his thankful message to all Japanese.

On the 15th of March he informed Tokyo by wire as follows: "I am determined to go out and make 'banzai' charges against the enemy at midnight on the 17th. Now I say goodbye to all senior and friend officers everlastingly." And he added three farewell songs in this telegram. From the morning of the 17th we were unable to communicate with him and we thought the 17th was his last day.

He was promoted to general on the 17th. We were all greatly surprised when we received his telegram on the morning of the 21st. We know from this telegram that he and his men (Army and Navy, altogether about 400 men) went out at midnight on the 17th and shut themselves in a cave about 150 meters northwest of his old cave.

He sent the following last telegram to us: "We have

not eaten nor drunk for five days. But our fighting spirit is running high. We are going to fight bravely to the last." I tried vainly at Chichi Jima to send him the telegram of his promotion to general on the 17th of March. On the evening of the 23d one radio operator informed me that he had heard "to all officers and men of Chichi Jima, Good-bye . . ." from Iwo Jima. I tried to communicate with him for three days after that, but I did not get any answer.

## IX. Why Japanese Soldiers Do Not Surrender

In Japanese opinion, if the Japanese soldier stands on a battlefield he ought to devote his body and soul to the only way, victory or honorable death. From ancient times this has been the Japanese soldier's custom, tradition, and common sense, and if by chance the prisoners of war return to their homeland after the war ceases they will be treated as cowards by all Japanese. Therefore, on Iwo Jima, on the 23d of March, even though there were only about 300 survivors, most of them did not surrender to the enemy and fought until the very end of their lives.

## X. Conclusion

When I look back on the Japanese defense plan and battle of Iwo Jima, I must pay many respects to the overwhelming material quantity and skillful operation of American forces. On the other hand, I am bursting with emotion, seeing the sacred spirit of Gen Kuribayashi and his officers and men who fought bravely for their honor.

Many Japanese and American brave men died for their country on Iwo Jima and I cannot calculate how many families and relatives these had. Now the bloody war has come to an end and the feeling of peace is here. There is no hatred and anger between American and Japanese.

I am very honored if my humble booklet will give a mere suggestion to American officers and men who served on Iwo Jima and to all Japanese and American surviving families to remind them of the situation in those days.

## Appendix

Instructions of war telegraphed from LtGen Kuribayashi to the Chief of the General Staff. I will write down the American tactics, effect of our arms, etc., from my poor memory.

1. From the landing of the enemy on Iwo Jima to February 20th, 2dLt Nakamura, attached to the 8th Independent Tank Gun Unit, destroyed one score amphibious tanks by personally handling his 47mm antitank gun. He died an heroic death.

2. However firm and stout you may build the pillboxes at the beach they will be destroyed by bombardment from the main armament of battleships. It is better to build dummy pillboxes at the beach and concentrate



the enemy's shooting at that point.

3. As the enemy uses plain language for reporting information, it is wise to listen to them and understand their plans and movements.

4. The violence of the enemy's bombardments are far beyond description. On a small island like Iwo Jima, when bombarded by various warships day and night and with 40 or 50 aircraft always in the air ready to fire on any target they are able to find, one man can scarcely move a step during daytime. Even at night it takes more than ten hours for a young officer to walk about one kilometer for communication purposes. Telephone lines are completely cut off.

5. All positions, especially the Southern district, are almost completely destroyed by the severe bombardment from ships. Camouflaged installations are greatly damaged. The bombardment from ships cannot be less than 30,000 rounds per day.

6. We need to reconsider the power of bombardment from ships. The beach positions we built on this island by using much material and many days of great effort were so destroyed within three days that they were nearly unable to be occupied. Every main position was also destroyed by day and night bombardment from ships and the lay of the land changed completely.

Beach-position firing was done from battleships and other warships anchored at a distance of 1000 to 2000 meters. Firing against main positions was done by sea-plane scouting and observing and was unsparing in time or ammunition.

The power of American warships and aircraft makes every landing operation possible on whatever beachhead they like and preventing them from landing means nothing but great losses. Therefore, for landing operations we must cut the number of coast guns and installations to the smallest and concentrate on crushing the ships. Defense of an isolated island that lacks this condition could not exist.


7. Adjacent to the command post of the enemy there is generally clamour, and there are some using lights.

8. The enemy finds radio stations by using a direction finder and concentrates his fire on them, therefore, the command post must be pretty far from the radio station, but at the same time it is necessary to take measures to insure continued communication between the two.

9. If you want to use telephones, you must bury the lines or at least build a gutter for them.

10. Long periods of time and enormous numbers of men used for the extension work on the first and Motoyama airfields have impeded defense, fortification, and drill greatly. We must avoid constructing hopeless airfields.

11. Positions must be selected where they are out of ships' range and yet have direct covering of the airfield. Especially we must attach great importance to antitank



25mm AA guns overlooking one of the landing beaches.

defense. Antitank obstacles must be built in and in front of the positions.

12. It is no exaggeration to say that victory or defeat in fighting on land is decided by aircraft and tanks. In the future we must endeavor our best to construct these two arms.

13. For artillery, middle-sized mortars (20cm) and rockets (20cm), and for antitank guns, type-90 field guns (7.5cm) are most effective.

14. Nearly all Army and Navy guns placed near the beach for firing on landing craft and troops were destroyed by the bombardment from ships before the enemy landed.

15. For defending an isolated island, it is absolutely necessary to accumulate large quantities of ammunition for guns and mortars, plus hand grenades. On this island most guns except the ones at seaside existed pretty long, but the ammunition ran short in only a week.

16. The enemy's air control is very strong, 100 or at least 30 aircraft are flying ceaselessly from early morning to night above this small island. And if they discover any targets they begin to attack them, led by observation planes that are quick and exact and give unimaginable damages to defense positions with the obstinate fire which they call from warships. If our antiaircraft guns start firing, the enemy aircraft usually destroy our guns at once.

17. The enemy tanks have strong destructive power, slow but steady advance, make full usage of material power, and are extremely hard to destroy. If our antitank guns appear they retire quickly, let the naval guns led by observation planes destroy them, and then advance.

18. The enemy has two or three handlers of flame projectors among 50 or 60 men, so it is necessary for us to snipe these handlers immediately.

19. The enemy's penetrating attack through our front line is done with tanks under cover of violent machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire so that we have no means to counter them.

USMC



## KOREA AWARDS

### Congressional Medal of Honor

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CAPTAIN CARL L. SITTER,  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of Company G, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces at Hagaru-ri, Korea, on 29 and 30 November 1950. Ordered to break through enemy-infested territory to reinforce his Battalion the early morning of 29 November, Captain Sitter continuously exposed himself to enemy fire as he led his company forward and, despite twenty-five percent casualties suffered in the furious action, succeeded in driving through to his objective. Assuming the responsibility of attempting to seize and occupy a strategic area occupied by a hostile force of regiment strength deeply entrenched on a snow-covered hill commanding the entire valley southeast of the town, as well as the line of march of friendly troops withdrawing to the south, he reorganized his depleted units the following morning and boldly led them up the steep, frozen hillside under blistering fire, encouraging and redeploying his troops as casualties occurred and directing forward platoons as they continued the drive to the top of the ridge. During the night when a vastly outnumbering enemy launched a sudden vicious counterattack, setting the hill ablaze with mortar, machine-gun and automatic weapons fire and taking a heavy toll in troops, Captain Sitter visited each foxhole and gun position, coolly deploying and integrating reinforcing units consisting of service personnel unfamiliar with infantry tactics into a coordinated combat team and instilling in every man the will and determination to hold his position at all costs. With the enemy penetrating his lines in repeated counterattacks which often required hand-to-hand combat and, on one occasion infiltrating to the command post with hand grenades, he fought gallantly with his men in repulsing and killing the fanatic attackers in each encounter. Painfully wounded in the face, arms and chest by bursting grenades, he staunchly refused to be evacuated and continued to fight on until a successful defense of the area was assured with a loss to the enemy of more than fifty percent dead, wounded and captured. His valiant leadership, superb tactics and great personal valor throughout thirty-six hours of bitter combat reflect the highest credit upon Captain Sitter, and the United States Naval Service."

HARRY S. TRUMAN



Maj Carl L. Sitter

Holt, Pfc Warren C. Howard, Capt Milton A. Hull, 2dLt Donald R. Jones, Pfc Ronald N. Levasseur, MSgt William J. McClung, Pvt Frederick J. Markland, Pfc Joen F. Meade, Pfc Charles H. Monroe, Jr., 1stLt George C. McNaughton, Sgt Henry E. Noonkester, Pfc Edmond T. Orsulak, Pfc James W. O'Toole, Capt George E. Petro, Sgt James E. Scott and Pfc Marvin L. Wasson.

#### Distinguished Service Cross

SSgt Bruce D. Henry, 2dLt Walter F. Murphy, Jr., Col Herman Nickerson, Jr., LtCol John T. Rooney, 2dLt Michael J. Shinka, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas.

#### Silver Star

2dLt John E. Baker, Cpl William L. Bentley, Pvt Paul Blevins, 1stLt Richard W. Crowley, Maj Daniel R. Davis, Pfc

#### Navy Cross

1stLt Joseph R. Fisher, Pfc Donald W. Gilligan, Cpl Weldon D. Harris, Capt Morse "L" Holladay, Pfc William P.



Donald Englehart, Pfc Kenneth O. Evans, Cpl Dennard M. Figg, Pvt. Jack S. Fischer, Sgt Kenneth R. Kipp, 2dLt Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Cpl Rubert D. Mark, TSgt Eugene M. Morrison, Pfc Donald G. Nuckel, Pfc James R. O'Conner, Pfc Baxter F. Oehler, Capt William J. Rainalter, Sgt Howard R. Rasberry, MSgt Ernest Roessner, 1stLt Paul P. Sartwell, Capt Valdemar Schmidt, Jr., Capt. Edward P. Stamford, Pfc Alfred Syvertsen, Pfc Jack D. Trader, Cpl Emil Trynoski, Cpl Andrew E. Vollo, Capt Arthur Wagner, LtCol Claude H. Welch, and LtCol Donald K. Yost (2d).

### Legion of Merit

LtCol Charles W. Harrison, Col Gordon E. Hendricks, LtCol Charles T. Hodges, LtCol Foster C. LaHue, LtCol William McReynolds, LtCol George R. Newton, Col Herman Nickerson, Jr., Maj Thomas J. O'Mahoney, LtCol Robert W. Rickert, LtCol Thomas L. Ridge, Maj Lawrence W. Smith, Jr., and Capt Byron C. Turner.

### Distinguished Flying Cross

Capt Kenneth L. Anstock, Capt Mont L. Bramon, MSgt James D. Briggs, Maj Evans C. Carlson, LtCol James H. Clark, SstLt George H. Dodenhoff, 1stLt Walter E. Domina, Capt Phillip G. Lye, 1stLt Robert B. Engesser, 1stLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Capt Howard J. Finn, Capt Don H. Fisher, 1stLt Sidney Fisher, Capt Melvin J. Flannagan, MSgt Dwight R. Francisco, TSgt Martin I. Frederick, Jr., Capt Charles D. Garber (3d), Maj Lloyd D. Randschy, 1stLt Neal E. Hefferman, Capt Robert W. Hoffman (3d), Capt Manning T. Jannell (2d), MSgt Lawrence N. Laugen, Capt William J. Longfellow (3d), Maj Joseph W. Mackin, Capt Rerbert G. Manning, Jr.

MSgt Rosslyn D. Manning, LtCol. Phillip B. May (2d), Capt John McCabe, 1stLt Jerry L. McCollom (3d), 1stLt Harrison J. McCown, Capt Henry D. Menzies, TSgt Wallace W. Mikelson, Capt Jerry E. A. Miller, Capt John D. Mitchell, Jr., Capt Robert F. Moore, Capt Vivian M. Moses, Capt Keith D. Nolan (2d), Capt Frank J. O'Hara, Jr., 1stLt Roy E. Oliver, Capt James R. O'Moore, 2dLt Stanley J. Osserman (2d), 1stLt Eugene M. Oster (2d), Capt Clarence W. Parkins, Capt Richard H. Peacock (2d), Capt Jack E. Perry, Capt Joe McPhail, Capt Kenneth F. Roisum, 1stLt Harold E. Roland, Capt Herbert E. Roser.

Capt Henry N. Schwendimann, 2dLt Ural W. Shardick, Capt John Skorich (2d), MSgt Avery C. Snow (2d), 1stLt Walter E. Sparling, Capt Grover S. Stewart, Jr., Capt John Strickland, Jr. (2d), Capt Donald S. Thornbury (2d), 1stLt Donald K. Tooker (2d), Capt Eddie C. Torbett (4th), Capt Harris C. Van Valkenburg (2d), Capt William J. Webster, Capt Thomas A. White, Capt Dean Wilker, Capt Jack H.

Wilkinson, Capt Frank E. Wilson, 1stLt Robert H. Wilson, Capt Theodore R. Yachik (3d), Capt Walter E. Yurs, and Capt William F. Zane.

### Navy and Marine Corps Medal

Sgt Steven F. Dembowski.

### Bronze Star

1stLt Almarion S. Bailey, Pfc Eugene Barlock, Cpl Wayne E. Breitweiser, Maj Henry Brzezinski, Sgt Don E. Burris, MSgt John A. Capozzoli, Jr., TSgt Daniel J. Carroll, Capt Nathaniel H. Carver, 1stLt Fred W. Conner, Jr., Pfc Robert E. Drennan, Sgt Melvin V. Eggersgluss, Sgt Robert S. Fairbanks, Sgt Earl I. Golding, Jr., Sgt Charles N. Hale, Sgt Ralph H. Hall, Pfc Raymond G. Hartman, Cpl Benjamin W. Hulsey, 1stLt Dexter H. Kimball, Maj Charles M. Kuntz, Pfc Joseph Laukaitis, LtCol James C. Lindsay, Maj John Lowman, Pfc Tommy E. Lusk, Cpl Roland W. McMaron, Maj Joseph W. Mackin, 1stLt William A. Mather.

2dLt Max A. Merritt, Sgt William F. Mills, Maj Rueben M. Monson, Pfc Placido R. Nuanes, 2dLt Arthur A. Oakley, Maj Francis F. Parry, Sgt George B. Potash, Jr., Sgt. Richard E. Raschke (2d), 2dLt Joseph W. Reisler, 1stLt Kenneth E. Rice, 1stLt Horace F. Roberts (2d), Capt Darwin B. Pond, Jr., SSgt Roy Scheidt, SSgt John J. Semensow, Sgt Raymond F. Shaddy, 2dLt Michael J. Shinka, Capt Edward D. Smith, Maj George A. Smith, 2dLt Norman R. Stanford, Capt John R. Stevens (2d), Pfs Ronald F. Stones, Capt Paul N. Storaasli, TSgt Charles A. Straw, Maj Harold M. Swain, LtCol Jack Tabor.


Sgt Eugene Tardiff, Sgt Stanley L. Thompson, MSgt Charles E. Udell, Pfc William R. Wall, Maj Jack F. Warner, Pfc Talmadge J. Wheeler, Sgt Calvin W. Williams, Maj Lloyd O. Williams and Cpl John R. Zupon.





# BUTTONING UP

## The Marines In Op



MAP 1



• A TESTIMONIAL FROM THE ENEMY IS ALWAYS GRATIFYING, even though it be given grudgingly. And after ending a month's anti-guerrilla operation on 15 February 1951, the 1st Mar Div captured a North Korean courier two days later with a communication paying a reluctant tribute to the Leathernecks.

The intercepted message had been sent by the Chief of Staff of the II Corps of the North Korean People's Army. It was intended for MajGen Lee Ban Nam, CG of the NK 10th Div—the guerrilla force which the Marines had been hunting in the Pohang-Andong area—and the G-2 translation read in part as follows:

"Get all of your troops out of the enemy encirclement and withdraw to the north of Pyongchang without delay. In case it is impossible to get your troops out of the trap, you may stay in the rear of the enemy and attack their rear positions." But this possibility could not have gleamed very brightly, for the message ended on a dubious note, "Do your best to get out of the enemy line."

Unhappily for North Korean purposes, there was not much left of the NK 10th Div to be salvaged. About 60 per cent of the original 6,000 to 8,000 troops had been destroyed, according to a Marine estimate. During the process the 1st Mar Div had chopped the remnants into small groups driven into hiding by day and flight by night. So hard-pressed was the enemy that a dozen minor roadblocks were the main achievements of a month's guerrilla operations behind the United Nations lines.<sup>1</sup>

The wreck of the NK 10th Div retained some nuisance value, of course, as long as the half-starved survivors were skulking in remote mountain areas. But the enemy had few other capabilities left to him, and it was believed that an understrength ROK division could handle the situation after relieving the Marines.

On 16 February, in accordance with Eighth Army orders, the 1st Mar Div began its move to the Chunju sector in the center of the UN line. At this time the division was made a part of IX Corps, commanded by MajGen Bryant E. Moore.

The Chungju move was a turning point for the Marines in more ways than one. In such past operations as Inchon-Seoul and the Reservoir, the division had been the best trained and most experienced major unit of X Corps. Naturally it had taken part as the landing force of amphibious assaults and spearhead of offensives. Even in the Pohang guerrilla chase, the division had been in effect a self-sufficient little army, carrying out its own special mission.

<sup>1</sup>An article in last month's MARINE CORPS GAZETTE was devoted to the Pohang guerrilla hunt. Previous Marine operations in Korea have been described in GAZETTE articles appearing in consecutive issues from June to December, 1951.

by Lynn Montross

In cooperation with the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, the GAZETTE herewith presents another in a series of official accounts dealing with Marine operations in Korea. Prepared by writers and researchers of the Historical Division, these articles are based on available records and reports from units in Korea. Also to be treated in this series:

#### Operation Ripper

#### The Chinese Counteroffensive of April

Publication is scheduled for consecutive monthly issues.

Admittedly it is too soon to write a definitive history of Marine fighting in Korea. Not only are enemy sources lacking, but even Marine and Army records are still incomplete. Articles of the length to be used in the GAZETTE, moreover, do not allow space for more than an outline of operations which will ultimately be given the detailed treatment of a monograph.

But timeliness is also an end to be sought, and these preliminary narratives are based on Marine and Army reports received up to this time. These articles are presented in the hope that GAZETTE readers will feel free to add to the incomplete record. This is an invitation, therefore, for you to supplement the existing record. Send your comments and criticisms, as well as any other information you can make available, to the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

All this was changed now. Henceforward the 1st Mar Div would be a unit of one of the largest and most cosmopolitan armies in which Leathernecks have ever served.

The United Nations establishment of February included units from 12 countries—Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Most of these contingents, ranging from company to battalion strength, consisted of picked men who gave a good account of themselves in action. It might also have been noted that the Eighth U. S. Army itself had undergone a transformation since the late summer of 1950, when the Marines had the fireman's role in the Pusan perimeter.

At the outset the Communist aggression in Korea found the democratic world unprepared. The first U. S. Army troops were sent straight from occupation duty in Japan to the firing line. Many of these men were soft physically and lacking in combat training. No soldiers of American history, in fact, ever drew a much more rugged assignment than the Army outfits thrown into action piecemeal during the early weeks.

Even during the two great Eighth Army withdrawals, there was little room for censure at the platoon level. A well-known military critic, making a first-hand survey of the U. S. 2d Inf Div retreat of November 1951, found "countless examples of extraordinary initiative and high individual courage . . . but none of utter dereliction or miscreancy."<sup>2</sup>

Of 16 infantry company actions examined in detail during this survey, only a single platoon appeared to have





yielded ground for any cause less serious than exhaustion of ammunition. And in the exceptional case, only 11 men were left unhurt in a routed platoon which brought off its own wounded.

Barely five weeks after the November retreat, the Eighth Army was hit by another CCF counteroffensive launched on the last night of 1950. Again the attackers smashed through a sector held by weary and thinned ROK divisions, so that the other major units had to withdraw to avoid envelopment.

INCHON AND SEOUL WERE ABANDONED to the enemy by UN forces which had fallen back about 200 miles from 1 December to 10 January. Such a record would not seem to offer stimulating food for morale, yet the Eighth was by no means a beaten or disheartened army. It was, on the contrary, a confident and aggressive army made up of combat-wise troops who had met the test of adversity.

The proof came when the new commander, LtGen Matthew B. Ridgway, began a rapid-fire series of Eighth Army offensives only a few days after the retreat ended. At this time the UN Forces held a line extending from the vicinity of Ansong on the west coast through Chechin and Marung-ni to the east coast. The Eighth Army was disposed with I Corps on the left, IX Corps in the left center, X Corps in the right center and on the right the battle-worn ROK Army.

THE FIRST OFFENSIVE OPERATION began on 15 January. A I Corps task force, spearheaded by a U. S. infantry regiment, drove nearly to Suwon without meeting serious opposition.

This reconnaissance-in-force ended on the 17th. Five days later a IX Corps task force, probing northward in that sector, also encountered few enemy troops.

The Eighth Army command lost no time at exploiting the CCF reluctance to engage. A new operation began on 25 January as another reconnaissance-in-force, but this time I and IX Corps employed a division each. The advance was in multiple columns "for the purpose of seeking out the enemy and inflicting the greatest possible damage."

Suwon and its airport were captured the next day. The pace was slow and methodical, with all units keeping close lateral contact and mopping up pockets of resistance before proceeding. More and more troops were committed until the operation could no longer be called a reconnaissance-in-force. It had turned into a full-scale offensive for the purpose of gaining and holding ground as well as destroying enemy forces.

Each day until the end of the month saw limited gains made and an estimated several thousand enemy killed.

<sup>2</sup>S. L. A. Marshall: *CCF in the Attack*, Operations Research Office, the John Hopkins University, Far East Command.

Thus on 1 February the UN front lines ran from the vicinity of Ansan on the west coast through Kumpojang and Wonju before dipping in a southeasterly direction to the east coast.


Not only was the advance continued in the I and IX Corps sectors, but a new limited offensive was planned for 5 February in the zones of the U. S. X Corps and III ROK Corps. This meant that the entire Eighth Army would be committed along a 70-mile front, with the I, IX, and X Corps in line from west to east. Still farther to the east were the three understrength corps of the ROK Army.

The 1st Mar Div was in Eighth Army reserve along with the Philippine 10th RCT and the Belgian and Canadian battalions. By this time the Leathernecks had pinned down the largest body of Communist troops to infiltrate into UN rear areas after the January retreat. During the operation the 1st Mar Div managed to train 3,387 replacements who arrived in January and the first week of February to relieve the hundreds of veterans selected for departure in accordance with rotation policies. These new men were given combat instruction by being sent on self-sufficient patrols which ranged far into remote mountain areas to track down groups of NK guerrillas.

SO MUCH PROGRESS was shown during the first two weeks of the Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt that CG Eighth Army inquired when the Marines could conclude the operation. MajGen Oliver P. Smith, CG 1st Mar Div, replied on 5 February that he could be ready whenever a relieving force was assigned the responsibility for the area.

The question of a new sector for the division had already been discussed late in January, when Gen Ridgway asked Gen Smith to confer with him at Suwon. The Eighth Army commander had considered using the 1st

**Patrol observation and reconnaissance were to be stressed.**





Mar Div north of Wonju on the central front or along the east coast in place of I ROK Corps. Gen Smith was asked to submit recommendations, and after consulting with his staff he replied on 2 February that various factors favored the employment of the Marines on the east coast.

Most of these factors derived from the capabilities of the division as the single major unit of Eighth Army which was fully trained and equipped for amphibious warfare. If such an operation were to be desired at some future date, the Marines could mount out from the east coast with a minimum of logistical friction. With their organic ANGLICO (Shore Fire Control Parties and Tactical Air Control Parties), they had the organization and know-how for making the most of naval gunfire and carrier air support. Finally, they could be supplied from the sea; and their Shore Party specialists would be able to develop port facilities for the support of the division.

After receiving Gen Smith's message, CG Eighth Army directed his staff to plan for employing the 1st Mar Div on the east coast. Nearly two weeks later, however, he summoned the Marine general to Taegu on 12 February to discuss the possibility of using the division on the central front.

The date is significant. For it was within the last 24 hours that the enemy had reacted to Eighth Army pressure with a large-scale counterattack which threatened to wipe out UN gains on the central front.


This was the first serious block thrown at the UN forces rolling steadily northward as one limited offensive followed another. In the X Corps sector, it is true, the new drive of 5 February had found hard going after the early

spurts. But I and IX Corps continued to advance, and on the 10th resistance seemed to collapse west and south of Seoul. The U. S. 25th Inf Div, pushing ahead 11,000 yards that day, secured the port of Inchon and Kimpo Airfield. Months of rebuilding would be required, however, before the air base could be made operational or the destroyed harbor facilities even partially restored.

ON THE MORNING OF THE 11TH, Seoul was within sight of UN forces occupying the south bank of the Han. But that sub-zero night dated the violent counterattack launched by elements of the CCF 40th and 66th Corps and NK V Corps in the Hoengsong area of the U. S. IX Corps front. The enemy effort followed a familiar pattern. Two ROK divisions were overwhelmed by the first CCF blows, and their retreat made it necessary for other UN units to withdraw. As a consequence Hoengsong had to be abandoned on the 12th to the Communists hammering out a salient in the direction of Wonju.

Reports of UN reverses were coming in that day as Gen Ridgway conferred with Gen Smith about the next mission of the 1st Mar Div. The Eighth Army commander recognized the advantages of committing the division to the east coast, where it would be in readiness for amphibious operations. But he considered the Seoul-Yoju corridor the logical avenue of a major CCF offensive; and he wished to have the Marines, as "the most powerful division in Korea," relieve the 24th Inf Div in the Yoju area of the X Corps sector.

Gen Smith, upon his return from the conference, put the logistical problems up to his staff. But there was to be no Yoju mission. Further UN losses of ground occurred south of Hoengsong the next day, and Eighth Army plans were changed again. On 13 February the 1st Mar Div received a warning order to be prepared to



Waiting for word to move out as enemy fire slows up.







move on 48 hours' notice either up the east coast or to Chungju. The latter seemed the more likely destination, since it was a road junction of the corridor on the central front which CCF forces might use for a great offensive.

Chungju it was. An Eighth Army operation order of the 15th directed the 1st Mar Div to occupy positions in that area, prepared either to defend or to conduct further operations under operational control of IX Corps. The 2d ROK Div relieved the Marines, and the move by road and rail to Chungju commenced.

A shortage of organic transport added to the complications. Although the 1st Mar Div had taken pride in bringing its equipment out from the Reservoir, the reward of virtue was a collection of old and worn vehicles. As a further irony, other outfits which had lost their trucks were able to requisition new ones.

While the Marines were making their move, the CCF counteroffensive continued full blast along the central front. Units of the U. S. 2d Inf Div, surrounded in the Chipyeong area, put up a stout three-day fight until an armored column cut through to the rescue. The UN forces were not guided by any unrealistic concept of holding ground to the last ditch. They sold it dearly, however, by defending favorable terrain or even counter-attacking with the support of napalm air strikes. Nevertheless, the enemy had penetrated east of Wonju by the 17th, and another CCF column drove within seven miles of Chechon. These advances seemed to be for the purpose of relieving UN pressure on the Seoul area, but Eighth Army staff officers did not discount the possibility of an all-out CCF offensive on the central front to divide UN forces and sever vital supply lines.

As it proved, personnel losses and depleted supplies gradually brought the CCF attack to a standstill after it had driven a bulge into the central front. Gen Moore reported to Gen Ridgway on the 18th that one of his regiments had probed forward without meeting opposition. This intelligence was passed on to X Corps, farther east, and patrols in that sector also found evidences of a CCF withdrawal.

Gen Ridgway made a practice of giving the enemy no time for rest and recuperation. That very evening,

therefore, he planned Operation Killer—the fourth successive attack to be launched by Eighth Army units since their January retreat. (Map 1)


This new limited objective offensive, like its forerunners, was designed to inflict maximum damage rather than to gain ground. Nevertheless, Gen Ridgway had determined to recover full possession of the hill mass north of Chungju. It was for this purpose, he informed Gen Moore on 15 February, that the 1st Mar Div had been employed.

"The force which holds Chungju," said Gen Ridgway, "has the situation in hand."

The overall scheme of maneuver called for the 1st Mar Div, as spearhead of the IX Corps advance, to relieve the 2d Inf Div and attack in a northeasterly direction through the Wonju basin from a line of departure north of Wonju. The object was to cut off enemy forces which had penetrated south and east of Hoengsong, and to recover control of the roads running eastward by seizing the high ground just south of the town.

Wednesday, 21 February, was set as D-day. The northwest flank of the 1st Mar Div was to be protected by the 1st Cav Div and 27th British Brig, including the Australian and Canadian battalions. And in the X Corps zone, on the east flank of the Marines, the 7th Inf Div was to make a simultaneous northerly advance up the Yongwol-Pyongchang road.

All these movements, in Leatherneck parlance, were to be coordinated in a tightly "buttoned up" offensive, with the forces keeping close lateral contact and maintaining the integrity of units. Patrol observation and reconnais-





sance were to be stressed, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in advancing ahead of schedule or by-passing hidden pockets of resistance.

The terrain of the Wonju Basin did not favor the attack. Rock heights, abounding in precipices, glowered down upon a region of narrow valleys and swift streams. The river Som, largest of all, ran from northeast to southwest through a defile cutting across the western part of the division area. Bordering this twisting stream was the main road, the Wonju-Hoengsong "highway" — a poor dirt trail even by Korean mountain standards. The only other road, crossing the eastern part of the area, was a narrow track scarcely fit for vehicular traffic.

It was believed that the enemy would make a strong stand at Hoengsong because of its value as the hub of roads in all four directions. The town served the enemy as a supply center; and a CCF division, the 196th of the 66th Corps, was reported to be dug in along the ridge to the south.

Gen Ridgway was on hand for the jump-off of the 1st Mar Div at 0800 on 21 February. On several previous occasions he had reiterated his basic directive to the Eighth Army. "We are fighting a numerically superior enemy," he was quoted as saying at a high-level conference of 16 February. "We must make up for it by good footwork, by maximum use of movement, combined with firepower."

These words might have been used to describe previous Marine operations in Korea. Although the Leathernecks were better known for their amphibious capabilities, they had demonstrated at Naktong Ridge, Seoul, and the Reservoir an unusual mastery of small unit operations, both offensive and defensive. The terrain in Korea and the techniques employed by the enemy made it primarily a small-unit war. At any time a battalion, a company, a platoon, or even a fire team might be compelled to become temporarily self-sufficient; and in these fights for survival, Marine maneuver and firepower paid big tactical dividends.

Operation Killer dated the first occasion in Korea when the 1st Mar Div took part as a unit of a large army making an advance in line on a wide front. But Marine doctrine did not stress self-sufficiency at the expense of co-



Terrain and weather gave more trouble than the enemy.

ordination; and the "buttoned up" attack had been no novelty in 1st Mar Div actions. Thus the division scheme of maneuver of 21 February envisioned an advance by two regiments in line, keeping close contact with each other and with the Army units on either side. (Map 2)

RCT-1, on the left of RCT-5, passed through elements of the 2d Inf Div and 187th Airborne RCT and attacked from a Wonju line of departure toward the high ground east of Hoengsong. Little opposition was encountered by RCT-1, with the 1st Bn leading, in an advance of four miles along the Wonju-Hoengsong road. The forward battalion dug in at dusk on high ground about three miles from the objective, and the 2d Bn moved up on the right. The night was uneventful except for the dispersing of two small enemy groups in the 1/1 area with mortar and artillery fire.

RCT-5 had meanwhile pushed its 1st Bn abreast of this position without contacting any enemy.

The same formation was used the next morning when that regiment again moved forward without meeting any resistance. It was a different story in the zone of RCT-1, where the 1st Bn was stopped by heavy automatic and small arms fire from Hill 166, the western knob of a ridge overlooking the Wonju-Hoengsong road. The men tied in for the night with the 2d Bn in readiness for a joint assault. And in the morning, after a brisk artillery preparation, the two battalions launched a frontal attack.

By 0900 the 2d Bn had gained a foothold on the center and right of the ridge which permitted observation on Hill 166, the objective of the 1st Bn. Two effective air strikes



were called on the position, which the 1st Bn secured at 1015.

That afternoon both battalions jumped off to attack the next ridge line. They met a stubborn resistance from CCF troops defending log bunkers with mortar, automatic, and small arms fire. The fight was hot and heavy for a few minutes, but elements of the 2d Bn decided it by seizing a portion of the ridge just to the left of the enemy bunkers. From this point they swept down the ridge line, overran the CCF mortar positions, and put the enemy remnants to flight. That night RCT-1 dug in on the high ground overlooking Hoengsong from the south.

RCT-5 pulled up abreast on the right to occupy three hills south of the town on the road leading east. The next morning that regiment met its first resistance when the 1st Bn stormed Hill 212 as the 2d Bn secured the high ground on the right flank. Meanwhile, in the zone of RCT-1, Marine tanks led a 1/1 combat patrol into Hoengsong itself.

Although the enemy had abandoned the demolished town, the two battalions of RCT-1 came under CCF mortar and artillery fire from the ridge to the north. Both CPs were shelled until counterbattery work by the 2d Bn of the 11th Marines silenced the enemy.

Thus the first phase of the Marine participation in Operation Killer ended with the assault regiments organizing their positions on the Corps objective and sending out patrols. RCT-7, in division reserve since D-day, had been patrolling the Wonju area and receiving the daily air-drops of supplies which were necessary to relieve a critical gasoline shortage.

FROM THE BEGINNING the logistical situation had given more trouble than the enemy. Heavy traffic had almost literally broken the back of the MSR, so that immediate and extensive repairs were required. Violent rains compounded the problem by turning rear area roads into quagmires, and streams into torrents. Marine engineers being needed for bridging in the forward areas, Division requested that IX Corps engineers be assigned to the maintenance of the MSR. It was also urged that indigenous labor be employed to assist in moving supplies.

Otherwise the first phase of Operation Killer had ended satisfactorily. Eighth Army units on either side of the 1st Mar Div had made gains, and the Marine capture of Hoengsong on the 24th nearly wiped out the salient left by the recent CCF counteroffensive. That same day brought bad news, however, with the announcement of Gen Moore's death from a heart attack after an accident in which his helicopter crashed into the Han River.

Gen Smith was appointed to temporary command of IX Corps, and BrigGen Lewis B. Puller, his ADC, assumed command of the 1st Mar Div.<sup>3</sup> When announcing this decision, CG Eighth Army said, "General Smith is

to be taken into their hearts in IX Corps, and, by definite action, made to feel that he belongs there."


The next few days were devoted to planning and preparations to resume the attack on an enemy reported to be withdrawing northward. This intelligence led to Eighth Army changes in corps and division boundaries with a view to shifting the direction of attack from northeast to north. In the zone of the 1st Mar Div these amendments meant that RCT-5 on the right would be pinched out by the 3d ROK Div of X Corps. On the left, the zone was extended by bringing RCT-7 into line alongside RCT-1 as RCT-5 dropped back into reserve. (Map 1)

The 1st Mar Div was directed by IX Corps order to continue the advance on 1 March and secure the high east-west ridge about one and a half miles north of Hoengsong. The town occupied a valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams, so that a triangular area of low, flat ground lay between the abrupt hills on all sides. From the high ground of their first objective line, the Leathernecks could look across this soggy plain which stretched past Hoengsong to the ridge which must be taken in the second phase of Operation Killer. (Map 3)

Marine air support was on a new basis. In February the units of MAW-1 had returned to Korea, after a reconditioning period in Japan dating back to the Hungnam

<sup>3</sup>MajGen Edward A. Craig, until recently the ADC, had departed for CONLUS duty and was succeeded on 2 February by Gen Puller, formerly CO of RCT-1.

Supporting arms never played a more important part.





evacuation. Upon their return to combat, the various squadrons came under direct Air Force control. This meant that Marine air would no longer be at the call of Marine ground troops according to Marine precepts. Instead, it would be directed by the Fifth Air Force through a central agency for the support of other Eighth Army units as well as the 1st Mar Div.

On 1 March there were six squadrons of MAW-1 in Korea. MAG-12 was represented by VMF-312 and VMF (N)-513, both based at Pusan. MAG-33 consisted of VMF-214 and VMF-323 (Pusan), VMF-312 (carrier-based), and VMF-311 (Pohang).

The 1st Mar Div scheme of maneuver for the new attack was conditioned by the terrain. For the ridge north of Hoengsong was separated by a bisecting road and stream into three distinct masses. The boundary between the two assault regiments passed through the central mass, so that RCT-7 had Hills 536 and 333 as objectives, and RCT-1 had Hills 321, 335, and 201.

☛ IT WAS APPARENT THAT RCT-7 had the harder task, since its zone contained the more rugged terrain in greater depth. It would be necessary for this regiment to take its first objectives, moreover, before RCT-1 could advance on the right without being held up by flanking fires from those heights.

Thus on 1 March, with the resumption of Operation Killer, the 1st Mar Div had probably the most difficult assignment in the Eighth Army. In the zone of I Corps the enemy grip south of the Han had been broken, and patrols found no signs that Seoul was being held in force. Enemy withdrawals were also indicated in the sector of X Corps, so that the UN front now stretched in a relatively straight and unbroken line from Inchon through Punwon-ni and Hoengsong to the east coast in the vicinity of Samchok.

☛ AGAIN THE 1ST MAR DIV was breaking ground for a new Eighth Army advance as the 2d and 3d Bns of RCT-7 attacked to seize the first hills west of Hoengsong. Little opposition was met at first from an enemy resisting briefly on each ridge before falling back to the next one. Both battalions pushed ahead about 1,000 yards before the 2d encountered heavy automatic and mortar fire. The CCF forces held an elaborate system of log bunkers along reverse slopes, but by nightfall the battalion had slugged its way to the forward slopes of the objective. Gains of about 1,500 yards were made in the zone of 3/7, where the enemy also put up a fierce resistance in prepared positions.

The day's encounters were a foretaste of those to come in the zone of RCT-7, where the terrain was too rugged in places for vehicles. Supporting arms never played a more important part. Marine tanks found lucrative targets among CCF strong points; Marine artillery fired 54

missions on 24 target areas; and Marine air flew 30 sorties.

On 2 March the other Marine assault regiment had its turn. Although the boundary lines had not been changed, the regimental commanders agreed upon a maneuver in which 3/1 was to cross over into the 3/7 zone for a combined assault on the high ground along the west bank of the river Som. Gains in this quarter would permit RCT-1 to move across the Hoengsong plain against the hills in its zone.

Both battalions jumped off at 0800 and met astonishingly little opposition from an enemy who appeared to be using tactics of withdrawing at night to defend new ridge lines. Thus the two battalions secured their objective by 0945 and finished mopping up at 1220. The 3d Bn of RCT-1 returned to its own zone for an assault on Hill 303, which fell to George Co at 1315 after another light resistance, though it took until 1600 to destroy CCF remnants dug in on the reverse slope.


The securing of the high ground west of Hoengsong enabled the 2d Bn of RCT-1 to cross the river behind tanks. After an intense rocket and artillery preparation, the column drove through the town and advanced northeast to seize Hill 208. The two assault battalions of RCT-7 were meanwhile advancing from a half to three-fourths of a mile in their zone.

On 3 March the assault troops of RCT-1 took their IX Corps objectives against light to moderate resistance. The enemy made a determined stand on 2d Bn objectives, Hills 201 and 335, but an air strike was called to evict the defenders while the 3d Bn advanced north to take Hill 321. Late that afternoon both battalions had reached the mopping-up stage when the 23d ROK Regt reported that one of its companies had been driven back, exposing the right flank of RCT-1. Able Co of the 1st Bn was brought up to hold Hill 335 while the 2d Bn moved over to protect the regimental right flank.

Btry K, 11th Marines in action near Chunchon.







"Do your best to get out of the enemy line"—Chief of Staff, NK Army

It was in the zone of RCT-7 that the enemy showed an almost suicidal resistance. The 1st Bn was summoned from reserve to attack Hill 536 and cover the regimental left flank while the 3d Bn continued its advance toward Hill 333. The 2d Bn, in the center, had the mission of assisting the other two with supporting fires.

Not only were the two hills natural fortresses, but both bristled with log bunkers and camouflaged mortar emplacements. It was a day of hard slugging for RCT-7, which lost most of the 14 killed and 104 wounded reported by the 1st Mar Div. By nightfall the 3d Bn had reached the ridge just south of Hill 333, but the 1st Bn met stiffer resistance and dug in about one and one-quarter miles short of Hill 536.

Engineers probe for antitank mines.



A tactical anticlimax is seldom disappointing to the assault troops, and the two battalions of RCT-7 which jumped off the next morning were pleasantly surprised to meet little initial resistance. Most of the Chinese had apparently withdrawn under cover of darkness, and the rest offered only delaying actions before abandoning Hills 333 and 536 in their retreat northward.

This was the final chapter of Operation Killer. It did not mean, however, that the fighting had ended on the central front. As usual, Gen Ridgway and his staff had been planning a new offensive before the old one ended.

Late in February it was decided to keep the enemy off balance by continuing the advance of IX and X Corps toward the 38th parallel. Another object was to outflank the Seoul area from the east, and the new plan would be known as Operation Ripper.

THE SEOUL CORRIDOR and the central corridor by way of Hoengsong, Wonju, and Chungju were still considered the most probable routes for an all-out CCF offensive. By securing the hills north of Hoengsong, therefore, the Leathernecks of Operation Killer had placed the Eighth Army in much better position either for defense or the resumption of the offensive.


Marine losses had not been heavy in view of this outcome. The total of 393 battle casualties included 48 killed, 345 wounded, and two men missing in action. The enemy, it was estimated by division G-2, had 1,868 casualties—1,255 killed, 570 wounded, and 43 taken as prisoners.

ON 5 MARCH, the day after Operation Killer ended, MajGen William H. Hoge, U. S. Army, arrived to take command of X Corps. Gen Smith, released from his temporary duty, resumed the command of the 1st Mar Div just as orders were received for Operation Ripper to begin on 7 March. Again the central front was to be the scene of the main line-bucking effort, and again the Marines were to carry the ball.

USMC

**NEXT MONTH:** The 1st Marine Division in Operation Ripper.





By MSgt Frank E. Copeland

APRIL 28, 1951, WAS AN IMPORTANT DAY FOR PEOPLE like myself, people who had (or have) an "R" after their USMC. A document known as ALMAR 15 was published on that day, giving me—and people in my shoes (9B)—the greatest opportunity ever offered to Marine Corps enlisted reservists. The opportunity for which I so proudly wield my pen is integration into the regular Marine Corps.

Whoa, don't go into the "I can make more loot on

the outside" routine. I made that one up. I even tried practicing what I'd been preaching, went out of the Corps, drew a bigger pay check, had fewer bucks! Why? I'll tell you why.

Every place I went I, not the Corps, footed the bill. Every place I shipped my gear, I again footed the freight. My family was transported 2,000 miles—same story. The 40-buck suits I bought cost me a cool \$75. Income tax was so high that I had to wear my shoes





until the soles were as thin as paper. No sir, there's no such thing as non-taxable allowances on the outside. I could go on for pages but here's the way I see this opportunity I'm raving about.

In times other than a national emergency, needs of the Marine Corps, budgetary limitations, and normal procurement of personnel would prohibit the now possible integration of enlisted Marine Corps reservists into the regular establishment.

training and fighting have been done right along with the regular. He has done a real job right along with the regular! The Corps is proud enough of that fact to offer him the opportunity of staying on the job.

It strikes me that the Marine Corps' needs are governed entirely by the job it is required to perform at any given time. Normally, qualified personnel in all phases of the operation perform the tasks necessary for smooth functioning of the highly-tuned mechanisms of the Corps.

# Integration!

Retention of rank is not a gift from HQMC, nor is it intended to be. It looks to me like a straightforward gesture of the sincerity and tangible value of the integration program. We can be safe in assuming that Headquarters is entirely cognizant of the disruption of civilian occupations caused by the voluntary and involuntary call of reservists to active duty. Integration into the regular Corps offers a steady job in a field of endeavor that fits each individual according to his qualifications. Isn't it then common sense to continue in a field that affords the natural fortification of familiarity? You and I know that as a Marine, there can be no doubt as to the requirements of a particular job. Reference to the Manual of Military Occupational Specialties, and questions asked of a commissioned or responsible noncommissioned officer will readily establish the facts concerning any present or future job responsibilities and requirements.

Let's realize that we are not only in a proclaimed national emergency; we are in the throes of a very real national emergency. Marines in the shooting war in Korea will attest to that. A great many of the Marines serving in Korea are reservists. They, like all components of the Reserve, have responded instantly and efficiently to the call. A strong, ready Reserve has again proved invaluable in the present emergency. What could be a more fitting reward for the reservist on active duty than to have the opportunity of integrating into the regular establishment? Absolutely none. His promotions have been considered right along with the regular. His

Today, however, the need for experienced personnel is great. Hence, another phase in the opening of the integration door is prompted.

Our Corps, like other government organizations, is required to operate within certain budgetary limits. Now, within the confines of that budget lies a somewhat restrictive Table of Organization. The intricately planned T/O calls for only a certain number of personnel in each rank. This personnel T/O must of necessity be strictly adhered to by Headquarters. Our current budget allows an increase in strength. That increase concerns the entire structure of the Corps. Consequently, another phase in the opening of the integration door is realized.

Procurement of personnel through the Recruiting Service fulfills our requirements during normal times. Although the Recruiting Service is currently straining all blood vessels, procurement of experienced and inexperienced personnel in the desired quantities is not entirely possible. The final push on the integration door is realized.


Present and future retention of rank for the reservist is contingent upon the same factors as those for the regular. In other words, "Reservist, now is your chance to get on the ball! Take advantage of schools, the Marine Corps Institute, and practical on-the-job training. The door has been opened. This is your chance to stride through into a secure future which will present the opportunity for you to become all that you have resolved to be." How about me? I shipped over last week!

USMC



41





## IF YOU WEREN'T SELECTED

By Maj Donald W. Swanson

☛ YOU CAN'T BELIEVE IT—PASSED OVER FOR PROMOTION! Here's the selection list, and your name should be right about there . . . only it isn't. It's not on the list at all!

Must be some mistake, of course. You've done a good job; at least, not any worse than some of the others have done. Sure, you've sounded off now and then, even tangled with the commanding officer a couple of times over things that didn't amount to much. That rubber check you accidentally wrote, for instance, and the time the MPs found you out of bounds. Just a little hard luck, that's all. Maybe you did get some low fitness reports, so what? You think they shouldn't keep you from being promoted?

Well, brother, maybe you don't know how much fitness reports can affect your future! I didn't realize how important they are either, until the Marine Corps made me one of the members of a promotion board.

Promotion boards—or selection boards, for they are called both—are necessary because the structure of the Corps does not permit as many senior officers as junior. The higher the rank, the fewer its members, so someone must be passed over by each board. The operation of our particular board therefore appeared, like others before it, iniquitous. We could not recommend all the officers on the long list furnished, but only the allowable percentage, and we had the displeasing task of listing those whose promotions were to be deferred pending action by some later selection panel.

No two promotion boards operate the same way. Each has to establish its own yardstick for selection knowing the allowance it has to work on. Under the rules, no officer may be promoted unless he is specifically recommended for advancement to the next higher rank, and two-thirds of the board must concur in the recommendations if the officer is not to fail of selection. Each case is fully reviewed and briefed, and each member must then ask himself: "If you promote this officer, would you like to have him in your command?" Often, that decision is a tough one to make. Each record has its good points or its bad ones, sometimes both, and the board weighs one against the other when it votes.

If an officer is not chosen, the board does not tell why; indeed, all deliberations are kept confidential, not to be discussed with anyone at any time. In the end, the selected list goes to the Secretary of the Navy or the President of the United States for approval, and until it thus becomes final it, too, is confidential. No one has any power to change it in any way, except that the Secretary or the President can remove a name. Once approved, it is not subject to review.

Serious study of the individual cases begins when the preliminary work of the board has been done—reading the precept, taking the oath, etc. Each selection board institutes a procedure under which its mission will be accomplished. Each individual's record includes not only his Marine Corps jacket but also accompanying



medical and JAG folders. These JAG folders contain proceedings of Boards of Medical Examiners, Naval Examining Boards, administrative reports, proceedings of Courts of Inquiry, Boards of Investigation, General Courts-Martial, and any other matters on file in the Navy Department which may be of interest to a selection board, and are often of considerable influence in the selection or non-selection of the officer concerned.

While a selection board normally looks upon purely physical derangements as the business of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery it is always possible that an officer's medical record might show some undesirable characteristics which would affect his promotable status. And so our board found. There was the officer who got hysterical whenever he heard planes; there was the sleep walker, and the officer who developed such a speech defect that no one could understand him. They might be good officers, but certainly not the best fitted for a duty which might explode into combat any day. And there were moral lapses. I remember one careless individual who had been a guest of the sick bay for repeated short stays, not being able to win any of his tilts with Bacchus no matter how often he tried. One member of the board observed that he had probably been raised on the bottle and never got over the habit. Nearly always the fitness reports for the period of hospitalization will reflect the opinion of the senior on such skullduggery, but occasionally it will not, as when the officer is in transit between duty stations and there is no tie-in.

ORDINARILY, UNLESS TIMES ARE TOUGH, there isn't much difficulty in getting promoted from second to first lieutenant. The duties of those two ranks are largely interchangeable and advancement is more or less automatic after a specified time in grade—provided, of course, there has been nothing on the record which would warrant withholding the promotion, as did happen occasionally during the last war. But beyond the silver bar, the selection system really takes over.

Promotion boards make their findings upon all prior service as an officer and the first fitness report starts with the date of appointment. For those who undergo ground training in the reserve officers' classes, the record contains a statement of college credits and several letters from persons who knew the would-be officer in his formative years, their recommendations being required to support the candidacy. Some of these letters are refreshingly frank, as when the Dean of Men at one of our larger southwestern institutions wrote concerning his

estimate of a young man as an officer, "I believe he has possibilities. He talks a lot, and loudly."

Still, as all officers realize from the vicarious wails which always follow publication of a promotion list, no selection board is perfect. Each one will make errors, if unintentional ones. A board will pick up an officer who turns out to be an eight-ball, for instance, and overlook a more competent one; yet the critics invariably disregard the fact that the board has had to make its decision on the officer's record, which for the most part consists of fitness reports.

THOSE REPORTS ARE DESIGNED TO SHOW what an officer's jobs have been and how well he did them, especially in combat. The current form has 27 markable performance items and came into use in 1950; it goes into considerable, careful gradation and differs greatly from the one familiar to the Corps for so many years. It is quite comprehensive (when the few recommended changes are effected, it should be even better) and it does one very important thing the old one did not do—it gives the rated officer a chance to know just how his superior values him. In the past, not many seniors consulted the hapless junior about his need for improvement, or even let him take a good look at the report itself, so quite a shock was usually produced when a report was pronounced unsatisfactory by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and bounced for comment. That was probably the junior officer's first inkling that he had not come up to the par established by his marking senior! Now, however, he signs the completed report before it is forwarded to Headquarters.

Some seniors mark high, leaning backward to award the junior an exemplary rating which they really believe he deserves. Contrariwise, there are those to whom no officer approaches perfection; I know one of our more rugged general officers who has a thorough distrust of the word "outstanding." Yet, regardless of the comparative honesty of the marker, all fitness reports must be taken at face value. Over a period of years the young officer will usually run into both the easy marker and the conservative one so that the averaged marks will give fairly accurate information as to whether he's worthy and well qualified for promotion.

Because military individuals are so different from each other, a selection board is always pained to analyze a fitness report on which every "X" is down the same column, for such a rating almost certainly shows that the senior could not be very familiar with the qualifications

**If you weren't selected, you may find the reasons here. If you were selected, you may learn why that five days' "hack time," or that one poor fitness report didn't hold you back**



of the officer he marked. We frequently ran across reports of one senior who took the trouble to fill out the form carefully but always specified, "My only contact with this officer was on reporting and detachment"! Perhaps he was trying to be fair, but he certainly caused the board to gnash its collective teeth, just as in the case of the replacement battalion major who wrote, "Apparently a good officer." That's all he ever said, but the very sameness of the reports took away all of their force and most of the meaning. There were other irritating reports marked "Not Observed," which inconsistently contained some comment setting a definite value upon the junior. Also, there were completely filled-in reports which covered very short transient periods, notwithstanding the impossibility of determining all of an officer's capabilities while he's a traveler on a transport!

What any selection board likes on a fitness report is evidence of careful evaluation, and finds it all too seldom. Painstaking marking requires a concentration few seniors were willing to give during the last war and frequently the job became so distasteful that the tendency was to hurry it up, to get it done. But if it is realized that a single carelessly marked report can, by blocking promotion just once, start a chain of doubt which may affect the junior officer's entire career, the potential unfairness of haphazard marking becomes apparent. Impartial judging of the individual's worthiness for promotion is best served by a conscientiously prepared fitness report, which certainly deserves any time it requires.

IN ADDITION to truthful character appraisals, the board appreciates supplemental remarks which give additional light. A gratuitous comment that an officer has much room for improvement in attitude and conduct arouses immediate interest; it is a cue to the board to note in which attributes the officer is lacking and to check his progress on future reports. Similarly, the officer who "had the best trained platoon in the battalion" has a definite edge on his contemporary.



OF COURSE there are jobs which are in themselves the indirect cause of poor markings. Very few Marines, for instance, welcome details as police officer, post exchange officer, or mess officer when there is combat around the corner. In aviation it's the flight instructor or the instrument instructor who might be stuck for months on these necessary Stateside tasks. The restlessness of these unfortunates is understandable, but despite the well known fact that *somebody* has to do such jobs, the incumbents are audibly discontented; yet there is no mistake as to whose neck is out when work begins to suffer, or when the commanding officer gets fed up with squawks over conditions he is powerless to change! There is no section on fitness reports reserved for marks on patience, but there well might be.

WHILE OUR CURRENT MILITARY DOINGS are being carried out chiefly by younger regulars and reserves whose practical, unjaundiced viewpoints are instrumental in getting the job done with the same effectiveness as during the last shooting war, we have many older officers among us, too. It is interesting to note that nine out of 10 officers over-age in their grades have higher than average marks. Of the young officers, except for combat medal winners and women (in the Corps, the ladies get either extraordinarily high marks or very low ones, and there is seldom any in-between rating unless it is by their own sex) the highest averages are maintained by aviation ground officers. One flyer explained that those officers had tough, thankless duties, had to be on the job most of the time, and never stopped working for the good of the flyers—why shouldn't they be appreciated? On the other hand, the airmen themselves are the most critical of their own calling, and poor reports possibly wash out as many aviators as training does. Aviation seniors also award more "hack time" than their ground counterpart.

"Hack time" is the Corps expression to describe punishment, usually by the commanding officer, for minor offenses. The customary practice calls for a letter to the culprit, recounting his alleged deviation from regulations and requiring his statement thereon; then the formal award of so many days' arrest depending on the degree of culpability. Not only does a copy of the accusation and its reply go to the officer's selection board jacket in Washington, but the infraction becomes an impor-





tant element in the fitness report next submitted, which shows the improvement noted, if any. There are many of these lesser crimes, but most common is absence from duty. Violations may also have their outcome in letters of admonition, of censure, or of reprimand; or on graver occasions, trial by court-martial. Promotion may be retarded, too, by unsatisfactory fitness reports, each of which requires (if the officer is available for comment) either his rebuttal or assertion that he desires to make no statement.

Naturally, the board digests each case thoroughly. It may take an exceedingly dim view of the misdeed, as in the case of a brig officer who, claiming ignorance of conditions, allowed his guards to persecute their prisoners when it was his business to know what was going on in his bailiwick. Or the officer who took profane advantage of his rank in dealing with his men—the closely-knit Marine Corps has no place for such conduct. The board may also judge the punishment adequate, as the 10-day suspension awarded the lieutenant who celebrated VE-Day by driving a motorcycle all over the company street, and the similar dosage given a pilot for using unseemly language over an inter-flight communication system. On the other hand, the board may come to the conclusion that the dereliction was too trivial to have any adverse effect on promotion—there was the officer whose one brew with his top NCO earned his commanding officer's displeasure, and another who was put in hack for giving a slot machine what he described as a "gentle shove" which broke the critter. Anyone who has fed a one-armed bandit knows the infuriation it can cause!

What does make a difference to the board is the rating given the officer during the misdemeanor period, for the next fitness report occasionally shows aggravated conduct; or it may show that the marking senior did not regard the transgression as very serious after all. For example, one officer was convicted and fined by a general court-martial for flying over his camp at less than 1,000 feet, yet he was rated by his commanding officer as excellent in all respects during that period. This particular officer, incidentally, went on to an outstanding combat tour.

Performance under combat conditions is, as has been mentioned, the criterion of a Marine. Low marks at school or in preliminary training, either aviation or ground, do not in themselves reject the officer who produces the right kind of results when the chips are down. The real proving ground is in the field. A platoon leader who earns only a fair mark on an assault landing has a hard row to hoe unless he gets another chance; when he does, he generally redeems himself.

☛ PROGRESS is one of the factors which the board follows very closely. Near the end of the war there was a general let-down among the services, and even the Marine Corps had some slight difficulty in preserving a business-as-usual attitude in some of those who had to remain overseas. The good Marine swallowed harder, prayed longer, but stayed on the job without visible resentment. The promotion board, encountering an occasional disgruntled senior's remark that his junior was lacking in interest and thought only about returning to the States, has to weigh the report carefully and to follow the officer's subsequent career to make sure this inharmonious frame of mind is not permanent, for if he does not shuck the inhibition in a hurry he isn't good material for promotion.

The board would rather recommend for promotion the officer who consistently improves his marks, particularly after he's gotten off to a poor start, than the flashy type who is a genius on one report and a poor excuse on the next, particularly when several different commanding officers reflect the same opinion. Once in a while an officer will slacken in his attention to duty and be downgraded because of it; in a fair number of these cases he has been miscast, the round peg in the square hole. We have any number of officers who were found not adapted for flying, yet turned out to be crackerjack ground officers! Faced with the fact that he's getting as mixed up as a Chinese fire drill, the intelligent officer will ask himself a few pertinent questions and, for the sake of his own promotable career, apply the right answers to his job.

☛ THE TRADITIONAL AUTOCRAT of the Corps is fast disappearing. The once inevitable personality clashes between the fire-eating old timer and his subordinates have given way to a surprisingly reasonable attitude on both sides. The modern commander is genuinely interested in the improvement of his junior officers, realizing fully that the cohesive Marine Corps depends immeasurably for its efficiency upon whole-hearted cooperation by all ranks. And in maintaining the already high proficiency of our organization, the fitness report, with its profound effect in sifting out the least qualified, plays the most conspicuous part.

USMC



A BOAT?

A VEHICLE?

AN AIRCRAFT?



# What is the HELICOPTER?



HELIBOATMOBILE

PT



The versatile helicopter has so many MOSs the Marine Corps is having trouble determining what it is, or who should control it

WHAT IS THE HELICOPTER? WEBSTER'S DEFINITION reads as follows: "helicopter, n. [F. *hélicoptère*, fr. Gr. *helix*, -ikos, spiral + *pteron*, wing.] A form of aircraft whose support in the air is derived from the reaction of a stream of air driven downwards by propellers revolving around a vertical axis."

This is a good definition; no better perhaps than the etymology of the word helicopter, but still good enough to give us at least a mental picture of the object defined.

Some may consider the question, "What is the helicopter?" to be pointless because we know what the helicopter is. We have helicopters with us. We see them every day. And they are providing essential services for ground and air elements both in training and in combat.

True, all true, except that it is not so certain that we do know what the helicopter is. Unquestionably, it is a form of aircraft. The question that I am propounding is associated with the use of the item rather than with the manner in which it is propelled.

The helicopter may be an aircraft in the sense that it executes missions normal for other types of aircraft. The helicopter may be a vehicle in the sense that it performs tasks that are normal for trucks and cars. The helicopter may be a reconnaissance or a signal agency. Or, the helicopter may be a boat, in the sense that it provides transportation from ship to shore, and from shore to ship.

Let us examine some of the helicopter's capabilities and see what conclusions we logically can reach in the light of those capabilities.

First, let us consider the helicopter as an aircraft. What kind of an aircraft is it? It isn't a fighter, nor is it a bomber. It may be a close support aircraft, although I know of no instances in which it has been so employed to date. It is an excellent reconnaissance plane within the limitations prescribed by range and vulnerability. It has a very important function as a transport aircraft within limitations which technical advances can be expected to extend. As a rescue plane it has no peer so long as its effective radius is not exceeded.

By LtCol Ralph M. Wismer





Having established that the helicopter is in fact an aircraft, in that it performs missions normal for other types of aircraft, it appears that the following conclusions are justified: (1) The helicopter should be under the operational control of aviators; (2) The helicopter should be manned by aviators; (3) Units requiring helicopters should submit requests in the same manner that other aircraft's services are requested.

So far, so good, but how about the other things which the helicopter may be? If we consider the helicopter as a vehicle, what kind of vehicle is it? It may be a cargo truck. It may be a personnel carrier. It may be an ambulance. It may be a staff car. The operations in Korea have proven its utility not only in these roles but in other miscellaneous roles, such as reconnaissance and signal work, which are normal for vehicular transportation.


Having established that the helicopter is a vehicle, and it has demonstrated its value as such, it appears that the following conclusions also are justified: (1) The helicopter should be under the operational control of ground personnel; (2) The helicopter should be manned by personnel qualified to operate helicopters for ground support missions, but these personnel do not necessarily have to be aviators in the usual sense of the term; (3) Requests for the use of helicopters should be submitted in the same manner that the services of other vehicles are requested.

At this point the problem of the helicopter becomes complicated, to say the least. As an aircraft one set of conditions applies to its use. As a vehicle these conditions do not apply, and in fact may be unacceptable.

When used as a reconnaissance agency or as a signal item, the helicopter again changes its identity. For its reconnaissance use the helicopter may be considered as a mobile floating observation post or as an extension of the security elements of the command. In this adaptation of the helicopter it is neither an aircraft nor is it a vehicle, in that the tasks it performs are peculiarly helicopterian and beyond the usual capabilities of both aircraft and vehicles.

Use of the helicopter as a signal item can be justified not only by need but by precedent as well. Just as vehicles are considered to be integral parts of mobile communication and electronic equipment, so may helicopters be considered as integral parts, whenever their sole functions are as carriers for such equipment.

Thus, in addition to the diametrically opposed conclusions which apply to the helicopter as an aircraft and as a vehicle, it appears that further conclusions can be justified regarding the helicopter as an agency of a specialized activity. These are: (1) the helicopter should be under the operational control of the tactical or technical activity concerned; (2) Special helicopters should be manned by personnel qualified not only in helicopter operation but in the specialty involved; (3) Requests



for the use of special helicopters should be submitted as dictated by the tasks which it is desired that the helicopters execute.

Next, let us consider the helicopter as a boat. What kind of boat is it? It may be a landing craft. It may be a control craft. It may be a reconnaissance boat. As a landing craft the helicopter provides the speed and flexibility which are becoming increasingly important as the potentialities of mass-destruction weapons are realized. As a control craft, through its speed and its ability to hover at whatever altitude may be required to give the control organization a panoramic view of the ship-to-shore movement, the helicopter may facilitate control while at the same time decreasing the problems attendant to resumption of control should the orderly progress of a ship-to-shore movement be disrupted.

As a reconnaissance boat the helicopter can be expected to expand the scope of amphibious reconnaissance not only in range, but in speed, and the achievement of increases in surprise and security as well.


Aircraft? Vehicle? Boat? What is the helicopter? I do not have the answer, but I am certain that the answer must be found before the full capabilities of the helicopter as a military instrument can be realized. I also am certain that the answer, to be correct, must contain equal consideration of the helicopter's mode of locomotion and its operational employment. Sole consideration of either will result in an incorrect answer.

Perhaps there is something symbolic in the fact that the word helicopter is frequently pronounced as if it stemmed from *helios*, sun, rather than from *helix*, spiral. The helicopter is not the center of a universe. Rather it is a satellite, traveling in a spiral orbit, the final course of which is yet to be determined.

USMC



# In Brief



*A radio-controlled life raft* that can be launched like a torpedo has been jointly developed by the Air Force and Douglas Aircraft. After being fired either from a torpedo tube or an airplane, an aluminum cylinder automatically opens to release a 22-foot rubber raft. The metal tube then becomes the keel of the raft, which has a four-cylinder inboard engine, fuel for 300 miles of cruising, a remote-control radio system, a two-way radio set, heating system, automatic pilot, and food and survival gear to last eight occupants five days. The plane or vessel that launches the raft will be able by radio to start or stop the engine and steer the raft to survivors on the sea.

*11,650 inductees into the Marine Corps* were received during January. This is the biggest call upon Selective Service by the Marines since the Corps started to employ this method of obtaining manpower last August.

Since Selective Service machinery was re-established a total of 794,330 inductees have entered the Armed Forces, and of this total, the Corps has received 48,030.

*The Navy's atom-powered submarine* will be called the *USS Nautilus*, an honored name in sub history. The keel of this atom sub is expected to be laid this spring, with the completion date estimated to be in 1954.

Among the expected advantages of atomic powered submarines will be their speed (up to 35 knots submerged) and their ability to remain submerged for long periods of time.

*A new FM handy-talkie radio* is going into production for Korea. It weighs about six and one-half pounds, can be slung over the shoulder, talks about one mile, and nets with a number of the other front-line radio sets.

*To horse or unhorse* is the question, and on this the Marine Corps and the Army have adopted divergent policies. At Quantico the Marines have instituted a special course in the use of pack saddles and horses to teach platoon commanders the use of the horse in modern combat. It is the contention of the Corps that the need for pack animals in combat was demonstrated in Italy and Burma, and more recently in Korea.

*A pilot model of a heavy tank* of entirely new design has been completed in the Chrysler Delaware Tank Plant. This model, designed by Army Ordnance and the Chrysler Corporation, was completed last November, only 10 months after ground was broken for the construction of the tank plant. This tank will "outslug any land-fighting machine ever built."

With details blacked out against the setting sun to safeguard military security, as here pictured, the huge land battleship looms against the skyline at the plant where it was made.







# KOREAN SKETCHES

**By Sgt Norval E. Packwood, Jr.  
Gazette Staff Artist**



✻ BELIEVING THAT THE ARTIST often can catch the feeling of war better than the cameraman, the GAZETTE editors dispatched Staff Artist Norval E. Packwood, Jr., to Korea the latter part of November.

Since his arrival, Sgt Packwood has been to the front lines, with the 1st MAW, and to the support areas. He returned to Japan to complete the first group of drawings for the February issue.

US ✻ MC

**ABOVE: "This is for the mountain goats." BELOW:  
Firefights have a way of aging even 19-year-olds.**



North Korean prisoners.



KOREA  
DEC. 51



S-2 officer interrogating prisoners.


한국의 겨울 풍경  
KOREA  
DEC. 51





"Who cranked off that round?"

This one came back on one wing.





Waiting to go to the front.



Tired Marine.



# RED CHINA'S THREE TOP FIELD

By Gene Z. Hanrahan



REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE KOREAN conflict it appears evident that Red China will remain our foremost enemy in Asia today. While her seemingly limitless hordes and ruthless "human sea" attacks have been stopped cold in Korea, indications are that she is already casting hungry eyes on the direction of greener pastures. Sadly enough these weak spots still exist, with Malaya, Indo-China, and Burma all offering golden possibilities for a combined revolution from within, and aggression from without. China's role as the dominant Communist nation in the Far East guarantees this continuation of war in Asia, for according to the existing code of World Communism, whether it be executed by Moscow or Peking, there can be no alternative but attempted total destruction for any free nation which dares oppose this ideology.

Whether it be tomorrow, next month, or next year, China will undoubtedly strike again, matching her armed might against the forces of democracy in the traditional Communist move and counter-move chess game for final supremacy in the world today.

And yet, though we have been engaging this enemy on the Korean peninsula for many months, our intelligence of the Chinese military machine, and of the men who run it, has been surprisingly limited, constantly cloaked and half-hidden behind the bamboo curtain of the strange and far distant Orient. That the Reds have long had huge dossiers, including even the minutest of details on all our own command and staff officers is taken for granted, but that we ourselves know so little about this enemy that our own military journals cannot even complete their full names is a situation that may have serious consequences in any future evaluations of this foe.

It is in view of this that a short profile of some of



the Chinese Communist professionals is given, in hopes that it may serve to cast some much needed light on these new military leaders in Asia.

Red China today has six top field commanders, a select and powerful group who control their forces with dictatorial authority, answering to no one, save a small supreme "Politburo" in Peking. These men are veterans of years of bitter guerrilla warfare, against enemies both from within and from without, and unlike most of their Western counterparts, they have been baptized and

GENERAL  
P'ENG TEH-HUAI



# COMMANDERS

nurtured on the field of battle, rather than in the classrooms or on the training grounds. Most of these men, aside from their normal military duties, perform dual tasks of civil and political administration of sections of China in which their forces are garrisoned, and their daily functions range over a wide area, from supervising rural agricultural production to the administration of 500,000-man armies in the field.

Though most of these leaders have very divergent origins, their mutual experiences and compatible goals have made them assume the outward form of a single being, constantly walking the narrow tortuous Communist party line, which governs every phase of their political and military lives. Their years of political indoctrination and party membership have been, as in the Soviet Union, a most necessary prerequisite to their present positions of command, and they well realize that, like all Communists, they must face the dilemma of rigidity in political thought, and initiative in military action. This contradiction has already proved almost fatal to the efficiency of the Russian Army, and whether it will be equally disastrous for the forces of the Peking regime, is yet to be seen.

But regardless of the restrictions inherent in Communism for the professional soldier, these six field commanders have, ostensibly at least, risen above their handicaps until they now both lead and form the vital nerve center of the Chinese Red Army, and it is upon their capabilities and limitations that the military fortunes of Red China must now rest.

Three of the six commanders are discussed here. They have not been selected because of their preeminence in the group, nor are they listed in the order of their importance. Suffice to say that they are among the top six of Red China's military leaders.



GENERAL  
LIN PIAO

GENERAL  
CH'EN YI





P'ENG TEH-HUAI



Deputy Commander of the Chinese Red Army, (known officially as the People's Liberation Army) is Gen P'eng Teh-huai, a well-tailored, melon-eating professional officer who has lived almost two-thirds of his life in the Army, 24 years of which have been spent fighting under the banners of Communism. P'eng today is second only to Gen Chu Teh in the military leadership of China; and Chu, aged and no longer militarily active, has been forced to delegate much of his authority to the younger commander, whose most important present post is serving on the five-man Secretariat, the "Politburo" of Red China.

P'eng's army career began in 1918, when his quick wit and physical prowess enabled him to rise from the position of a lowly private to the command of a platoon in the army of a local warlord, all in the space of several short months. The succeeding decade of Gen P'eng's military life was marked by a series of constant skirmishes and forays against bandits and dissident elements in Hunan Province. He rose steadily in rank, attending both the Hunan Military School, and the Kiangsi Officer's School, and by 1926, the young commander was marked as a coming officer in the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek.

But P'eng Teh-huai's leisure hours, spent in studying the weighty writings of Marx and Lenin, were gradually leading him away from the military career he had so long coveted, steering the young officer closer and closer to the path of Communism. He found such texts as Bukharin's *ABC of Communism* especially pleasing to his military mind, and soon after the 1927 purge of the Reds by Chiang Kai-shek, he became openly sympathetic towards the Communist cause. It was but a short time later that a leftist friend sponsored P'eng's application for membership in the then underground Communist Party of China.

Once officially inside the Red fold, P'eng led a revolt within his own army unit, shortly after organizing an uprising in northeastern Hunan Province. He later commanded a rugged, poorly equipped 1,000-man guerrilla force which joined up with larger Red elements under the overall leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, and almost immediately assumed a position of military leadership within the Communist organization, then very much starved for experienced professional officers. Becoming a close friend of Chu Teh, the young soldier took part in scores of engagements with the Na-

tionalist forces for the next five years throughout southern China, finally commanding elements of the retreating Red Army on its epic 8,000-mile Long March to Yen-an in 1934-35.

By 1937, the Sino-Japanese War had broken out, and P'eng Teh-huai assumed the post of Vice-Commander of the Communist 8th Route Army, serving as field commander under the top direction of his old superior, Chu Teh. When the disastrous civil war began, P'eng assumed the seemingly contradictory dual posts of Communist spokesman on military matters in Gen Marshall's cease-fire efforts, and planning officer of the much discussed Communist strategy in North China, (his success in both positions was painfully evident with the victorious Communist conclusion of the civil war), and finally by 1948, he was considered to be the supreme coordinator of the five million-man Red Army.

Gen P'eng, interestingly enough, is not noted for his exploits on the field of battle, nor for his staff work, but more as an astute politico-military thinker and guiding architect of theoretical guerrilla warfare. During the drawn-out Sino-Japanese conflict, P'eng advocated the theory of "total-mass protracted resistance," a novel concept for applying the vast population and limitless space of China to the greatest advantage for the defenders. Realizing that Japan lacked adequate manpower to police the 300,000-odd villages in occupied China, P'eng was among the first to suggest that the Japanese strategic inner lines of communications, transportation and supply bases, could be easily turned into defensive outer lines by the effective utilization of guerrilla warfare throughout the enemy's rear areas.

The Red general recognized the importance of guerrilla warfare as being the only possible method of salvation for the Chinese people, and advocated that the principle policy of defense for North China should be based upon complementing large-scale mobile warfare with constant guerrilla activities. He formulated 10 basic rules for a guerrilla force to follow if any attempted operation were to be successful, and summarized the main points as follows:

1. Guerrillas must not fight any losing battles. Unless there are strong indications of success, they should refuse any engagement.
2. Surprise is the main offensive tactic of a well-led guerrilla organization. Static warfare must be avoided. In a lengthy positional war, the enemy has every advantage, and in general, the chances of partisan success diminish in proportion to the duration of the battle.
3. A careful and detailed plan of attack, and especially of retreat must be worked out before any engagement is offered or accepted. Superior maneuvering ability is a great advantage of the guerrillas and errors in its manipulation mean extinction.



4. Great attention must be paid to the military dissolution of any local enemy-sponsored militia or puppet troops. Unless these elements are destroyed or converted, it is impossible to mobilize the masses.

5. In a regular engagement with enemy troops, the guerrillas must exceed the enemy in numbers. But if the enemy's regular troops are moving, resting, or poorly guarded, a swift determined surprise flank-attack on an organically vital spot of the enemy's line can be carried out with only a few hundred men against an enemy of thousands. Surprise, speed, courage, unwavering decision, flawlessly planned maneuver, and the selection of the most vulnerable and vital spot in the enemy's anatomy are absolutely essential to the complete victory of this kind of attack. Only a highly experienced guerrilla force can succeed in it.

6. In actual combat, the partisan line must have the greatest elasticity. Once it becomes obvious that their calculation of enemy strength, or preparedness, or fighting power is in error, the guerrillas should disengage and withdraw with the same speed as they began the attack. Reliable cadres must be developed in every battle. Resourcefulness of subalterns must be greatly relied upon.

7. The tactics of distraction, decoy, diversion, ambush, feint, and irritation must be mastered.

8. Guerrillas must avoid engagements with the main force of the enemy, concentrating on the weakest link, or the most vital point.

9. Every precaution must be taken to prevent the enemy from locating the partisan's main forces. For this reason, guerrillas should avoid concentrating in one place when the enemy is advancing, and should change their position frequently, two or three times in one day or at night, just before an attack.

10. Besides superior mobility, the partisans, being inseparable from the local mass, have the advantage of superior intelligence, and the greatest use must be made of this. Ideally, every peasant should be on the intelligence staff of the guerrilla commander.

The two most intangible but important assets for any successful guerrilla operation, according to P'eng, are the correct maintenance of a satisfactory balance between the support of the peoples for the guerrilla forces, and the political consciousness of the men within the ranks of the military itself. To the Chinese commander, both were mutually beneficial and complementary. He believed that

within the regular army and the guerrilla units alike, political awareness was of paramount importance, and of this once remarked:

Both guerrillas and regulars not only have military responsibilities; they have a far more important political mission. Their duty is to organize the people, mobilize the people, awaken the people's patriotism, arouse their enthusiasm for war, expose the false propaganda of the enemy and the traitors, destroy puppet organizations, set up an anti-enemy authority, build up guerrilla bases and at every turn, prevent the enemy from exploiting our manpower and natural resources. Therefore a guerrilla fighter in the rear of the enemy is not only a warrior, he is also an armed propagandist and organizer, and a fighter. His responsibilities are great.

General P'eng was a major advocate of constant political indoctrination both in the irregular and regular forces of the Chinese Red Army. Following the pattern established by the armies of the Soviet Union, P'eng Teh-huai drew up detailed plans for thorough Communist political and propaganda work both inside and outside of the military establishment. He once remarked, "Some people say that military men need not have political knowledge. Such an idea is either a policy to make fools of military men or an insult to them. We are fighting at all risks, but must know what we are fighting and dying for."

Such a statement is characteristic of this commander, clearly reflecting his many years of training under the influence of Communist politico-military theory. Perhaps today some of our own special service and psychological warfare officers can take heart at this recognition of their potential value, for this medium has long been neglected by our own military leaders. No doubt Gen P'eng if observing our own military forces would be appalled by the lack of "political consciousness," not only of the average US fighting man, but of the traditional man in the street as well, for every Red general worth his salt knows that a thoroughly indoctrinated people can, and should, be used at any cost to gain a victory, whether it be in the form of sabotage, guerrilla activities, or pitched battles, for in Communist military theory the assistance and awareness of the masses is a basic factor.

The real value of Gen P'eng's own political awareness has long been recognized by the central Peking Government, and this particular ability resulted in his assuming the chairmanship of the Northwest Administrative Area Government in 1949, including China's "wild-western" provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, Shensi, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang. With P'en Teh-huai's own First Field Army garrisoning the region, the Chinese Reds had hoped that the politically astute P'eng would be able to keep the northwestern provinces, China's vulnerable back door,



in peace. The area, bounded by Tibet, Russia, and Mongolia has been a constant bone of contention, with both the USSR and India eyeing its strategic position and vast underdeveloped mineral resources. Peking relied upon this Red commander to maintain a Chinese balance of power throughout the region, a task that well proved to heavily tax the full "political consciousness" of Gen P'eng.

Significantly, P'eng Teh-huai's first sizable victory in that area, the annexation of Tibet this year (probably masterminded by P'eng and executed by Liu Po-ch'eng), has been one derived more from political than military strategy, with the weak, diplomatically immature Tibetans falling easy prey to the superior stratagems and maneuvers of their "comrades" from the lands to the east.

When the first Chinese response to the United Nations cease-fire proposals came in June of this year, again it was entirely logical that Peking should pick its most politically nimble-minded leader, P'eng Teh-huai, as "Commander of the Chinese Volunteers" to head the Red efforts at the peace tables. Such counters as requesting that the discussions take place in South Korea at Kaesong, suggesting a 10 or 15 day delay, and arranging for a Communist monopoly on news correspondents at the first meetings, all psychological maneuvers to give the Chinese an apparent victory out of defeat, may well have been born in the mind of this shrewd veteran officer.

Gen P'eng's character has oft times been summed up as "heavy as lead and sharp as steel," qualities that have been markedly evident in the past, but which will probably be tried to even a greater degree in the future, as Red China attempts to re-vamp and build her military structure along more advanced material and technical lines . . . a formidable task that will probably rest squarely on the well trained and disciplined shoulders of Comrade P'eng Teh-huai.

### LIN PIAO

The closest the Chinese Reds have yet come to anything that may be considered an amphibious operation was the 1950 "assault" on Hainan Island, a 14,000-square mile Nationalist outpost located some 15 miles off the China mainland.

The Communist landings on the island were planned and executed by China's youngest field commander, 43-year-old Gen Lin Piao, a junior leader whose battlefield acumen and youthful vigor have catapulted him to a position high in the Red military hierarchy.

The capture of Hainan was crude by Western standards, far from what we now recognize as using modern amphibious techniques. Rather, the entire operation, had it been contested by a determined foe, would have much more closely resembled the British debacle at Gallipoli than the "victorious amphibious assault" that the Chinese Reds have recorded in their military annals.

Leading a haphazard composite invasion fleet, made up of several thousands of junks, reinforced by a few captured United States LCVPs and LCMs, Gen Lin jumped off at daybreak and by nightfall of the same day, he managed to land most of his troops at several widely scattered beaches. Before the second day had passed, the Communists, pushing out from their established beachheads, were well on their way to securing the island. The entire operation was remarkably short and remarkably effective.

Although the Chinese now extol this invasion as demonstrating their wide range of military flexibility, to neutral observers this boasting is not entirely warranted. Indeed, such an operation can not even be considered an assault (as we now know it), for the invaders were neither opposed on the beaches, nor farther inland, but easily advanced against the fear-ridden Nationalists, whose resistance, like their inept officers, melted away before the surging Red tide.

But if nothing else, Lin Piao must certainly be credited with a rather left-handed slap on the back, for anyone who could successfully organize, mass, and direct such an operation, considering the material and troops at hand, deserves considerable administrative, if not tactical, credit. The creation of some semblance of order out of chaos is an ability not to be lightly considered in a military leader, and Gen Lin's Hainan invasion was, in this respect, a classic in military organization and resourcefulness.

Like P'eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao owes much of his early military training to his present enemies, the Nationalists on Formosa. Educated at the Whampoa Military Academy, China's "West Point," Lin made a brilliant school record for himself, graduating in 1925 with high honors. But the constant political indoctrination at the war college, given by such experienced professionals as Gen Gallen (Russia's top Far Eastern military expert), and Chou En-lai (the present Chinese Foreign Minister), was to have severe effects upon the impressionable 17-year-old officer. This "political education" paid off well for the Reds just two years later, when Col Lin Piao, of the Fourth Kuomintang Army, deserted in the midst of the 1927 purge, and joined forces with the newly outlawed Communist Party.



As a graduate of the Whampoa Academy, Lin received quick recognition within the ranks of the Red Army. His education and natural leadership ability soon gained him the command of a battalion in 1927, and of the Fourth



Red Army in 1929. Lin Piao played a leading command role during the early 1930s, a period marked by intensely bitter campaigns against the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek, and the young leader was credited with much of the tactical planning of the great Red retreat in 1934-35.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Lin held down dual posts as commander of the Red 115th Div, of the Eighth Route Army, and that of founder and first president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College (the K'ang Ta) in Yen-an. The Red college concentrated on guerrilla warfare, elementary combat principles, and effective political leadership; and the former Kuomintang officer supervised the military education of many of Red China's junior officers, men who are today slowly moving up through the ranks to positions of command in the modern Chinese Red Army.

Lin's first major recognition, outside of Chinese military circles, came in 1937, when Communist units under his command decisively defeated a Japanese brigade at P'ing Hsing Pass in Shansi Province. Notably important as the first major battle in which the Chinese Communists actively sought out and aggressively attacked the Japanese Army, the Chinese defenders capitalized upon this singular victory, fully exploiting the psychological and military aspects of the operation.

Following the victorious engagement, Gen Lin wrote a short, but compact critique of the battle, a study that has since been a required text in Chinese military schools. Although many of the tactics advocated by Lin in his work are familiar to the student of military science, probably the most exceptional point of this study is the masterful balance between psychological, political, and military analysis of the battle, a most important criterion for any good Communist study.

In his "Experiences of the Battle at P'ing Hsing Pass," Lin gives a vivid account of the haughty Japanese mechanized forces being defeated by the numerically and materially inferior Chinese. He reiterates the importance of snapping the enemy's supply lines by utilizing separate mobile guerrilla-like elements, and advocates further uses of these units in assisting a main defending body throughout the entire battle. Of this he stated:

We should utilize the period of attack by the enemy forces upon our own positions to raid his flanks and rear areas. This is an excellent tactic. Similarly, the choice of the moment of his moving, setting up new positions, or occupying fresh ground are also favorable times for the assault. This then is utilizing the exact time, while the enemy is devoting all the attention and strength at his disposal against our main defending troops, to suddenly strike at his rear.

To overcome the enemy's superior equipment and firepower, Lin advocated a policy of military "contiguous-



Gen Lin Piao's troops landing on Hainan in April, 1950.

ness", keeping his troops on top of the enemy infantry, or as he reported, "thrusting into the enemy's flesh," so that the planes and heavy artillery of the opposing forces would be largely neutralized.

Like many of his fellow officers, Lin Piao recognized the importance of night attacks, reporting that they formed the most important singular tactic for the Red forces, especially when they suffered from inferior conditions caused by either a lack of adequate equipment or firepower. Similarly, guerrilla warfare was held in high regard by Lin, both used independently or in conjunction with regular forces.

By 1940, Gen Lin Piao's own military career was temporarily curtailed when he was wounded four times within the space of a few short months. Relinquishing his command, the young officer was forced to travel to the Soviet Union, receiving extensive medical treatment in various Russian hospitals and sanitariums for his multiple wounds.

Although only partially recuperated, Lin returned to his homeland in 1942, and was given the comparatively inactive post of negotiator for the fallacious "United Front" policy in Chungking. For the succeeding three years, Gen Lin's face was a familiar sight in the wartime capital, sitting in on Red press conferences, or quietly looking out over the beautiful Yangtze Gorges.

BY 1945, THE CRACK COMMANDER was entrusted with the command of the United Democratic Army in Manchuria, with orders to "Consolidate the area militarily and the people politically!" This accomplished, the Reds gave Lin the difficult task of building up Manchuria as the principal staging area and Red jumping-off point for the long awaited civil war; and while American cease-fire teams ranged throughout North China, and US Marines garrisoned and protected the weak Nationalist supply and communication lines, there is considerable evidence that Gen Lin took advantage of the artificially created stalemate to build the cadres for his Fourth Field Army, supplying the new forces with Russian, Japanese, and captured US equipment, and quickly massing the army for the coming campaign against the Kuomintang.

The pattern of the civil war was almost pre-ordained,



with the Reds first drawing in the over-extended and poorly led Nationalists, leading them far into the depths of the Red areas. Then, in the traditional defensive-offensive strategy of Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao led the initial counterattack against the enemy, pivoting from the Manchurian provinces, down through the key Shanhaikwan Pass, and into the vast North China Plain. Joining up with other Red forces, the greater Communist armies soon completed their conquest of China, capitalizing on the low morale and poor leadership of the Nationalists.

Credited with the decisive field leadership of the civil war, Lin Piao and his veteran Fourth Field Army were given the "honor" of the liberation of Korea. For five full months Lin directed the see-saw battle against the United Nations, matching his wealth of manpower against the overwhelming firepower of the defenders.

Although generally agreed that the Chinese were waging a losing war throughout, there is some evidence that Gen Lin's ability as a field commander did not suffer as much as we might first be led to believe. The constant night attacks, leap-frog tactics, and psychological policies of attack and surprise still testify to the military acumen of the Red general. All in all, lacking equipment, armor, and air support in Korea, it may well have been only through the expert leadership of this officer that any further Chinese disaster on the peninsula had been forestalled.

Yet, for some unexplained reason, Lin was replaced in March, 1951, by P'eng Teh-huai, and although not generally believed to have fallen from the good graces of Peking, the Red officer was ordered to withdraw his badly battered Fourth Field Army and reform in central Manchuria.

Today, though the combat efficiency of both the young general and his "ever-victorious" army are in question, there is yet indication that he is to be again tested on the field of battle, with reliable reports indicating that both Lin Piao and his troops are slowly moving out of Manchuria, down through southern China, and marching in the general direction of the Indo-Chinese border.

### CH'EN YI

Serious-minded irregular Ch'en Yi has long been an important military leader in the Chinese Red Army. Reported killed in action more than a dozen times during the past two decades, Ch'en has managed to keep his battle-scarred physique in good enough condition to warrant top field command in today's Red forces.

His lack of formal military education has been an asset rather than a shortcoming, and the 53-year old general long ago proved that he was well suited for the protracted defensive-offensive guerrilla style operations that have characterized the Chinese Reds these many years.

Today, veteran soldiers take great delight in relating an episode which occurred during the final stages of the Sino-Japanese War, testifying to the caustic personality of the Red officer.

It seems that an exasperated Japanese line commander, fed up with the Chinese "unorthodox guerrilla methods" dispatched a note to Ch'en challenging him to stand up and meet the Japanese in combat. The enemy officer concluded, "Personally, I should praise your tactics; but they are not soldierly, they are sneaking and underhanded and we dare you and your men to come out for a showdown battle."

Not to be outdone, Ch'en Yi quickly penned off his response, and forwarded it to the enemy officer:

We accept your challenge, but propose that for an impartial decision as to the better fighters, both sides should fight on equal terms, using the same weapons and equipment. Further, we ask that a delegation from a neutral state be imported as referees. Finally, if we are defeated, I will take my men to some other front, publicly acknowledging you to be the superior fighters. But if you are defeated, both you and your soldiers will return to Japan.

Needless to say, the Japanese response to Ch'en's proclamation was given a short time later in the form of an all-out attack on the Chinese positions.

Gen Ch'en Yi was born in Szechwan Province in 1898, the son of a wealthy landlord. He traveled abroad shortly after the conclusion of the First World War and spent some time in Paris, where he organized the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Among a group of Chinese radicals requested to leave the country by the French Government, Ch'en returned to his native country, where he joined Chu Teh's revolting troops as Political Commissar in 1927.



Commanding various guerrilla forces during the decade from 1927-1937, Ch'en's military career was established only by a hard system of trial and error on the field of battle, a slow, costly process substituting the enemy and bullets for the more conventional instructor and textbooks. But the foreign educated Red gradually forged

his own command with each new skirmish and each new campaign.

When the now famous Long March began in 1934, Ch'en Yi was picked to remain behind, charged with the task of delaying the enemy and salvaging what little remained of the Communist forces in southeast China. Hanging on with almost inhuman tenacity and bulldogged



determination, the Red officer managed to gather together scattered guerrilla units, keeping his weak and ill-equipped force always just a few steps ahead of the pursuing enemy.

When the Sino-Japanese War began, Ch'en was rewarded for his successful rear guard action with the post of vice-commander of the Communist New Fourth Army, companion force in south central China to the better known 8th Route Army. In 1941, the New Fourth, long a sore spot in the soft underbelly of Nationalist China, failed to execute the field directives of Chiang Kai-shek in a projected operation against the Japanese, and instead, concentrated upon consolidating large areas of unoccupied China, and politically indoctrinating the people.

The impatient Chiang, unable to contain his hatred for the Reds any longer, took the occasion to rescind his previous "United Front" policy, attacking the New Fourth with elements of his own Nationalist armies. Taken completely by surprise, the Red Army was decisively defeated, and its commander, Yeh Ting, arrested. Again Ch'en Yi, escaping the Kuomintang attack, was given the difficult task of salvage, and ordered to reorganize the survivors and continue the operational existence of the New Fourth.

ALTHOUGH ACTIVELY ENGAGING in the civil war, Ch'en's most important post was one of civil administration, governing an area of East China which gave him absolute control over such metropolitan centers as Hangchow and Shanghai, the seventh largest city in the world. Commanding the Third Field Army, Gen Ch'en Yi was instrumental in planning and directing the 1950 Communist blood bath in east China, executing thousands throughout the area in an attempted purge of all dissident elements, individuals, and groups who might have proved troublesome for the Peking regime.

Seldom heard from in Red military journals, Ch'en today stands out as a self-educated guerrilla tactician and fully trustworthy field commander. Even though his more orthodox military associates may long for such refined techniques as large scale, mobile, and positional operations, Ch'en himself still tenaciously clings to his singular guerrilla tactics, methods which have served him so well in the past. During the civil war, although most of the Red generals were proclaiming their newly won ability of carrying on large scale positional warfare, Ch'en was still reporting, "Our military tactics are based upon principles of strategy that cannot be found in the text books of the military academy."

But Ch'en Yi's analysis, although unsophisticated, is yet militarily sound. He demonstrated his acute observational ability in 1947, when he reported on the course of the Nationalist-Communist war, accurately predicting both the forthcoming results of the war and the causes of the Nationalist disaster.

Gen Ch'en summed up the Nationalist losses and Chiang Kai-shek's inept generalship with:


The present heavy Kuomintang casualties are the direct result of Chiang's habit of giving his commanders certain definite time limits for achieving their objectives without any regard to the feasibility of maintaining this time table."

In respect to the psychologically advantageous but militarily disastrous Nationalist attack on the Red capital at Yenan in 1947, Ch'en concluded:

According to orthodox military policies the Communists should deploy their best troops in defense of their capital city. We should be considering how best to defend Yenan and how long we can hold it. Actually, we are not taking any of these measures. Instead, we are only concerned with how many of Chiang's troops we can annihilate. . . .

Yet today, although Gen Ch'en Yi ranks as one of Red China's six top field commanders, there is considerable indication that Peking would gladly "retire" both Ch'en and men like him from further positions of high leadership in the army. Peking probably well realizes that such men as Ch'en may have served the country and the army well in the past, furnishing the backbone for the historic guerrilla forces of old, but in China's "modernized" army of the future, the call is out for new leaders, men who have the professional training and the technical know-how to command a modern mechanized army—men whose leadership will be equally demonstrated in armor, artillery, and air power as well as guerrilla warfare. And such young officers are now in evidence, men who may, in the near future, seriously jeopardize the present position of command of such old irregulars as Gen Ch'eng Yi.

USMC



Russians erected this monument in Mukden, Manchuria.




# Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

## Whitney's World Travels . . .

LONE AND LEVEL SANDS—Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney. 314 pages. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young Inc., 1951 \$4.00



That Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney is a gentleman of considerable accomplishments is a fact conducive to little argument. That such accomplishments include the possession of a gifted pen is extremely dubious as witnessed by the publication of *Lone and Level Sands*.

The story of an Air Force colonel, *Lone and Level Sands* is hardly to be considered a valuable contribution to either the history or the literature of war.

In brief, it seems the USAAF commissioned Mr Whitney a major from civilian life in 1942, presumably upon the strength of his experience as a pursuit pilot in WW I. He was, in his own words, "a combat intelligence officer, with no knowledge of what his duties were." That he eventually found out what he was supposed to do, at least to the satisfaction of someone of fairly elevated position in the Air Force hierarchy, is evidenced by the fact that he became eventual recipient of the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Service Medal, and a set of colonel's eagles.

Throughout some 314 pages, author Whitney leads the reader on a rambling, first-person tour of his various duty stations during the course of WW II. At times the reader becomes confused as to whether he is reading Col Whitney's story, or has suddenly come upon a page from *Who's Who*, slipped into the text by an errant book-binder. The pages of *Lone and Level Sands* are literally

crammed with the names of great, near great, and *hoi polloi* with whom the colonel came in contact during his global merry-go-round. This irritating and boring recording of practically everyone he ever met is reminiscent of the late Ernie Pyle's journalistic objective which consisted of seeing how many proper names he could jam into one paragraph.

The book is liberally illustrated by some 60 photos taken by the author, whose own photograph, incidentally, appears no less than 12 times. The quality of the pictures leads one to the conclusion that Col Whitney is no more accomplished with his Leica than with his pen.

Since in all things there is some value, so it is with this chronicle of Col Whitney's odyssey from Calcutta to Iwo Jima via Natal and Samar. The book's sole contribution evident to this reviewer is a first hand look at the role of the USAAF in the battle for El Alamein. A role, which for reasons best known to themselves, has so far been either ignored or overlooked by contemporary historians.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is its title, which admirers of Shelley will recognize as a portion of the last line of his poem *Ozymandias*.

In summation this reviewer is conscience bound to proffer the following advice. To prospective readers: don't! To Col Whitney: stick to race horses and airplanes!

Reviewed by Maj Philip N. Pierce

## A Guide to Russia . . .

THE SOVIET SYSTEM, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF—Edited by James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera. 495 pages, including Topical Guide. Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr, 1950. \$6.50

Though the title suggests ponderous aspects of the subject, this is *the* book if you are tired of reading conflicting accounts propounded by pseudo-military and geopolitical experts.

It is a collection of basic documents essential to an understanding of the Soviet Union, including, for the first time in one volume, translations of the major constitu-



tional codes, laws and administrative provisions of the U.S.S.R. state power as well as the programs and rules of the dominant party.

The subject matter is arranged in nine sections, following the widely accepted, if oversimplified, division of Soviet history into phases highlighted by the March and November Revolutions, the Civil War and Communism, the New Economic Policy, the Five-Year Plans, the Stalin Constitution, World War II, and Reconstruction.

Those interested in the war preparedness and Soviet defensive establishment shortly before World War II will find especially illuminating information in Section VII, *From The Stalin Constitution to the Second World War* and Section VIII, *War Measures*.

This highly important documentary collection should find a special niche in the serious-minded military man's reference shelf—the instructor and commanding officer who is often confronted with “stumper” questions during unit school sessions. The book will not of course answer all of the stumpers, but it will in some measure, through its *Topical Guide*, enable the military lecturer to hastily thumb to the source of information while at the lectern.

There are numerous references to the establishment of the Red Army, police, internal security, mobilization and defense, as well as civil defense.

Among the documents are important declarations by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zhdanov, and Simonov.

James H. Meisel is an associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He specializes in the fields of Soviet government and modern political thought. His co-editor, Edward S. Kozera, who received his M.A. from the same university, is at present with the Russian Institute, Columbia University, having obtained a certificate in Russian studies from that institution.

This book is by no means the be-all and end-all of information pertaining to the Soviets, but we'll wager that you'll find many hours of fascinating, informative reading—background for extended discussions during off hours.

Reviewed by Sgt Lawrence M. Ashman

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